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organizational development throughout the years of Fascist rule in
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Conservative countermeasures and Allied pressures, however,

diminished the Communist advantage until, by 1947, the Party was no
longer represented in the postwar government.

The success apparent in

the economic arena due to the Christian Democrat's program initiated
in their monocolore government of 1947 and an East-West demarcation
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internationally, with the Soviets gaining control in Eastern Europe,
created for the general elections of April, 1948 an atmosphere ripe for
Christian Democrat exploitation.

The election was disastrous for the

PCI; the combined Connnunist-Socialist ticket drew slightly in excess of
four million votes, one million fewer than the coalition had gathered
in the 1946 elections.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Mussolini came to power in 1922.

Four short years later, in 1926,

he had deprived every opposition party of the parliamentary mandate.
Italy became a totalitarian state; the leaders of the parties who
opposed Mussolini and his rule either went into exile and hiding or
they were arrested and imprisoned as they attempted clandestinely to
bring about the end of the dictatorship.
Mussolini dreamed of Italy as a great power.
was one of nationalist and imperialist aspirations.
in 1935 and conquered her in 1936.

His foreign policy
He invaded Abyssinia

He joined with Hitler in the Rome-

Berlin Axis in the same year and supported Germany's annexation of
Austria and the Sudetenland, and in her occupation of Bohemia and
Moravia.

In 1939 Albanian borders were violated and the country subdued

by Italian forces.

Finally, in May, 1939 Mussolini formed a defensive

and offensive alliance with Germany.
Though he had claimed the status of a nonbelligerent at the
opening of the Second World War, in roid-1940 Mussolini declared war on
Britain and France in order to share in the spoils of Germany's successful campaigns in the North.

However, Italian troops were ill-prepared

for the rigors of the conflict.

Expeditionary forces in Libya, Abyssinia,

and later Greece, were decisively routed.

Instead of Mussolini's

dreams of Mediterranean hegemony, Il Duce was forced to rely upon
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German forces, eventually relinquishing the perogatives of the Commando
Supremo within its own theater.

Even with substantial German support

in Libya, Tunisia, and the Balkans, Italy's defenses were gradually
forced back to the homeland.

Tile price for German preeminence was an

Italy left relatively unqefended in favor of Axis campaigns in the East.
On July 25, 1943 Mussolini was deposed and imprisoned.

In August

Marshal Pietro Badoglio's government accepted the inevitable and began
negotiations with the resurgent Allies.

Nazi Germany's domination of

the affairs of Italy, however, was not so easily dispelled.
In September, 1943 Italy was a country divided.

In the South

the Allies had both occupied and liberated their reluctant foes.

In

the North the Germans had usurped civil authority, with Mussolini's
neo-Fascist Social Republic as a figurehead.

Faced with this set of

circumstances anti-Fascist Committees of Liberation made up of representatives from existent political parties began to emerge openly in
the South and clandestinely in the North.
rid Italy of the Germans and the Fascists.

Their immediate aim was to
Tileir long range aim

concentrated on the rebuilding and restructuring of Italian society.
Between 1943 and 1944 a provisional coalition government comprised
of representatives from the six major political parties and the
monarchy was formed, and shortly after the Allied troops reached Rome
it began to operate from that city.

One of the parties represented in

the coalition government was the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), the
Italian Communist Party.

Tile PCI had been established in Italy in

1921 when a group of dissidents broke from the ranks of the Italian
Socialist Party.

During Mussolini's consolidation of power, primarily

in 1926 and in the years immediately following, Communist leaders were
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either arrested and imprisoned or they went into exile.

TI1roughout the

years of Fascist domination in Italy the Communists aggressively opposed
Mussolini and his forces.

Wherever they were able--in joining Popular

Fronts, in fighting in the International Brigades during the Spanish
Civil War, in organizing the clandestine effort in Italy--they fought
the Fascists.

During the crucial period from 1943 through 1945 when

the Italians were fighting to rid their country of the German menace,
they more than any other group demonstrated acumen in the political
arena and initiative in the Resistance movement.
As participants in the Rome provisional government and as the
leaders of the Resistance, the Communists clearly put into practice the
dictates of their fallen leader Antonio Gramsci:

in the South they

carried on the "war of position" while in the North they fought the
"war of movement."

The "war of position" and "war of movement" are two

metaphors created by Antonio Gramsci in an effort to deal with the problem
of how Communism succeeds in an advanced society.

Gramsci maintained

that revolutionary strategy is of necessity different in backward
societies and advanced societies.

The war of movement, the use of

guerilla tactics to destroy the superstructure of society with "lightening blows at key points," is the tactic to be used in the backward
societies.

The war of position is, in political terms, the long

campaign of "passive resistance" inside the superstructure of bourgeois
society.

The revolutionary party must work within the parliamentary

structure on its (parliment's) own terms.

Gramsci believed that the

war of position was the primary tactic in Western advanced societies,
but he also felt that the war of movement must be continued (in the
factories and in the field) in order to "convert success into revolution."
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As a party which was an active participant in the provisional
governments of the resistance years, the PCI was determined to maintain
its status.

It looked forward to the postwar years when it would function

with viability and credibility as a working party within the governmental
structure.

As the leader of the Resistance its goals were twofold:

to drive out the Germans and to prepare for the restructuring of
Italian society.

What follows is an analysis of the role played by

the Italian Communist Party in Italian politics and the Resistance
movement during the years 1943 through 1945.

CHAPTER II
OUTLINE:

THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN ITALY 1921-1941

In looking at this particular period for the Partito Comunista
Italiano (PCI), the Italian Communist Party, three issues will be
explored.
Party.

The first will deal with crises within the evolution of the

The second will discuss the Party and its relationship to

Fascism, and finally, the third will concern the Togliatti leadership
from abroad and its clandestine efforts within the peninsula.

A

discussion of these three issues serves to point out the long-term
presence of the PC! in the Italian socio-economic scene.

More importantly,

an understanding of the roots of the PC! in the Italian national framework will lead to a comprehension of the strength of the Party manifested
during the armistice and liberation periods 1943 through 1945.
The first area of discussion covers the early years, roughly 1921
to 1926.

In 1921 the PC! came into existence

The Communist Party in

Italy, like Communist parties in other European s t ates, came into
being as a result of internal conflicts

wi~h in

a l re ady existing Socialist

parties and also because of stimulus from abroad, that is, the success
of the Bolsheviks and the appearance of German Communism.

1

The Italian

Socialists had for a long period been in confli c t concerning methods of
operation based upon differences in philosophic;1.l ·:lutlook.
1

There were

Sidney Tar row, Peasant Communism in Southe :r n Italy (New Haven,
1967), pp. 101-102.

6

two main branches:

the maximalists and the reformists.

2

A new group

arose in the Party shortly after the First World War which was in favor
of using the war in any way to promote revolution within the Italian
state.

This new group included such leaders as Amedeo Bordiga from

Naples and a coterie who would come to be called the Torinese intellettuali:
Antonio Gramsci, Palmira Togliatti, Umberto Terracini, and Angelo Tasca.
These men were the real founders of the PCI.

At the Seventeenth Congress

of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) in Leghorn in January, 1921, this
radical faction walked out of the meeting and out of the ranks of the
PSI forever.

This extreme decision was reached for three reasons:

Firstly, and in general, the Bordiga-Gramsci faction felt no accommodation
could be reached with the moderates or with the maximalists, secondly,
and most importantly, they could not at all agree with the decision of
the PSI delegates sent to the 1920 Congress of the Third International
who had refused to accept all of the International's Twenty-One Conditions,
two in particular.

One stated that the names of parties would now include

the word Communist as opposed to the word Sociali st; the other declared
that all parties belonging to the Comintern would expel reformists from
their respective organizations.

3

Thirdly, and specifically, the

"Conununists" were disgusted with the success at the polls of the
Socialist Party moderates in the postwar elections .

For all these

2

The history of Italian socialism i s th " h7_s t ory of conflicts
between the maximalists and the reformi sts . !:lte. maximalists who were
based in Milan had as the foundation of their :: ':li ~ osophy orthodox Marxism;
they were in favor of revolutionary action n.nc we"l'.'e opposed to participating
in parlimentary democracy. The reformis ts su~p ~ ~ t ed gradual social
change within the framework of a parliame :~ ta:i:y '•; stem.
3

John M. Canunett, Antonio Gramsci and t h e Or igins of Italian
Communism (Stanford, 1967), pp. 104-107.
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reasons, the PCI had been born and it did take root.

Though this was

the case, all was not to be easy; the new party was going to have internal
problems of its own.
Initially the PCI had its "immediate elan of unity."

It accepted

all of Lenin's theses, evident in its Organic Act of Constitution.
The Theses proclaimed the imminent dissolution of capitalism
and the necessity of armed conflict between the workers and the
bourgeois state, the hegemonic role of the proletarian party,
and the goal of the destruction of the bourgeois state and the
immediate establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat.4
Underneath this apparent manifestation of unity, however, ideological
conflict between the Bordiga camp and the

Gr~ci

camp was brewing.

Bordiga was from non-industrial Naples, while Gramsci had spent his
political life in the industrial center of Turin; in outlook they
were definitely different.

Bordiga and his followers felt that first

an overthrow of the capitalist state must occur and then would follow
the construction of socialism.

Gramsci, on the other hand, who had

first-hand experience amid the industrial turmoil of Turin, felt that
the capitalist state could be changed from within as a first step
towards, and in preparation for, the workers' revolution.

Towards

this end, he and his followers had begun to establish the Consigli di
Fabbrica modeled on the idea of the soviets.

These workers' councils

had as their ultimate goal, through gradual escalation, the takeover
by the workers of the means of production.

In 1919 Gramsci had written:

The socialist state already exists potentially in the
institutions of the social life of the exploited working class.
To tie these institutions together •.. to centralize them powerfully ... me~ns creating from then on a true and real workers'
democracy.5
4
5

Tarrow, pp 102-103.
Tarrow, p. 103.

8

And during the labor movement in Turin in 1920, he and the Ordine Nuovo
group had fought with G. M. Serrati concerning the possession of power.

6

Gramsci and his "Communists" of Turin believed that the masses could be
elevated only by possessing power.

Serrati and his maximalists of Milan

dictated that the possession of power was the culmination of the general
7
.
.
e 1 evation
of h
t e pro1
etariat.
Amedeo Bordiga, however, totally disagreed with Gramsci's
thinking on this point, and he accused him and his followers of espousing
a reformist position.

"Bordiga's greatest fear was that the Communist

movement would be 'contaminated' by the values of 'bourgeois liberalism'
and democracy, whether these values were expressed by traditional
'democrats' or Italian Socialists. 118

As far as Bordiga was concerned

there could be no acceptance of these values, values he saw promulgated
by Gramsci.

For him, as opposed to Gramsci, the purity of the party

was much more important than winning over the large numbers of the
working class.

The only really important factor needed for a productive

revolution was a "truly revolutionary elite" which would enact his
(Bordiga's) own intractable, Marxist-oriented plan.
thinking, there was no room for the

To his way of

Cons i gl~ _di Fabbrica. 9 Antonio

6

Ordine Nuovo (The New Order) was the group established by
Antonio Gramsci in 1919 in Turin. This group--it took its name from the
left-wing Socialist Party publication also founded by Gramsci--began the
drive for the workers' control of the factories hy establishing the
Consigli di Fabbrica mentioned above.
G. M. Serrati was a maximalist Socialist leader from Milan and
also the editor of Avanti!, the Socialist Party Daily.
7cammett, p. 103.
8
9

Canunett, p. 159.
Cammett, pp. 159-160.
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Gramsci was the winner in this internal struggle of ideology between
himself and Amedeo Bordiga.

Before his arrest in 1926, and with his

Lyons Theses with which he set out to frame the Italian road to
Communism, he had become the leader of the PCI both intellectually and
politically.
The second area of discussion under consideration also covers the
early years 1921 through 1926, but from a different perspective.

These

are the years when Fascism was establishing itself as the only politic a l
power in Italy, and in these years is born the seed of the long-term
struggle between the Italian Connnunists and the Fascists.

What needs

to be considered during these years is the relationship between Mussolini
and the Communists and perhaps some indication of the consequences
which developed as a result of that relationship and which would be
manifested during the later years of their struggle in the 1930's,
and finally even in the Resistenza (Resistance) itself.

In their

relationship to the Fascists, neither the Socialists nor the Communists
represented any real threat for Mussolini during the initial years of
his consolidation of power.

Either the party was weak from within, as

was the case with the Partito Socialista I taliano (Italian Socialist
Party), or it was unwilling to or unable to for its own reasons combine
with other parties in an effort to stop Mussolini and his Fascists, as
was the case with the PCI.
Mussolini was expelled from the Social i st Party in 1914.

Re

established his Fasci Italiani di Combattimento i n 1919, and from that
time on he used force against his former party .

The split in the

Socialist Party which had resulted in the cr eation of the Communist
Party from its ranks in 1921, the inability of the PSI leadership to
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be decisive in moments which demanded decision, and finally, the lack of
support received by the Party in the 1921 elections, all contributed to
providing Mussolini with a weak competitor in his bid for power. 10
With the PSI in this weakened condition, with the PCl only a fledgling
political party, with the government in Rome going through a series of
crises, resulting in the fall of Facta's cabinet in June of 1922, and
with Mussolini and his newly formed Fascist Party (November 7 to 11,
1921) making the most out of turmoil, the situation for the antiFascists was crucial.

At this critical time an unfortunate action

occurred, and though the PSI was not directly responsible, it bore the
brunt of Mussolini's action and was yet another indication of the
Party's general ineffectiveness.

A group of trade unions called the

Alleanza del Lavoro (Alliance for Labor) chose, without the approval
of the Socialist Party, to call a general strike.
This poorly timed move provided the Fascists with an excellent
opportunity to renew their attacks on Socialists and Socialist
centers--an opportunity of which they made the most. On
August 2 they moved on Ancona and took Socialist Buildings by
storm, and then repeated this operation at Leghorn, Genoa,
Milan, and several other places. In the Lombard capital they
threw out the Socialist municipal government, took on the job
of running the local transportation system, and produced D'Annunzio
to give their intervention an aura of nationalist respectability.
Withal, they gave Italians the impression that they could and
would save the country from anarchy.11
The culmination of all this violence was Mussolini' s March on Rome and
his subsequent call from the King to come to Rome to form a government.
He was riding on a crest, and once again the Socialists, and this time
the Communists, proved unable not only to stop

~im,

but unable to even

try to stop him.
10

Shepard B. Clough, The Economic Histo!:Y_ of Modern Italy
(New York, 1964), p. 214.
11

Clough. pp. 215-216.

11
He pushed through his reform of the electoral system in 1923 and
called for new elections in April, 1924.

Both the PSI and PCI were

unwilling to or not able to--Clough speaks of their inability to-bring their forces together in order to present a common list of candidates to the voters.

The Fascists were victorious.

Tarrow indicates

the PCI did not "recognize" the need to join its forces with that of
other parties in an effort to fight the Fascists.
secession as a case in point.

He cites the Aventine

When in utter disgust 123 deputies walked

out of the Chamber as a protest against the murder of Giacomo Matteotti,
the moderate Socialist who had earlier criticized the government from
that very Chamber, the Communists did not as a party join the walkout.
Later they joined the secession, allying themselves with Socialists,
the Sturzo Christian Democrats, and others, but they "refused to seek
the reestablishment of constitutional government, and continued to make
violent attacks against the non-Communist parties."
did not in reality act out collaboration.

12

The PCI, then,

The sub s equent consequences

of this unwillingness or inability on the part of the PCI must be initially
dealt with at this point.
On the one hand, the failure to stop Fascism in the early stages
hurt the PCI's efforts to organize within Italy a resistance because of
the imprisonment or exile of most of its l e aders , and because of Mussolini's
strength and tactics.
12

These will be taken up i n the third section of this

Whether Gramsci as leader of the PCI failed to "appreciate the
radically new nature of Fascism" as Tarrow steadfastly maintains, or
whether he in fact did understand the true import of Fascism as is
argued by Cammett, is an interesting digression of thought. For this
paper, however, even if Gramsci did understand "the novel aspects of
Fascism," and the writer leans towards this t:hes is, it must still
deal at the level of fact.
(Tarrow, p. 104.)

12
chapter.

On the other hand, the very difficulties in communication bet-

ween the leaders who were living outside of Italy and those cadres
working within Italy actually worked in one way to the benefit of the
Communists.

Because of the breakdown in communication the Hitler-

Stalin Non-Aggression Pact 1939-1941, which proved to be so damaging
to the reputation of Communist parties in other European countries,
did not have that negative effect on the PCI.

When the Pact was signed

the Italian Communists were working secretly against Mussolini on the
peninsula, and they continued to work.

By the time they received the

message, the Soviet Union had been invaded by Germany; the International
was once again preaching ardent anti-Fascism.

"Thus when legal political

activity began again after World War II, the PCI, unlike its French,
German, and American counterparts, had a relatively clean slate.
has never ceased to profit from this record. 11 13

It

Finally, the very fact

that they resisted and carried on an underground movement during these
early years put them in a position of regional, and thus local control,
\

a position they occupied when it came time to fight the Salo forces in
Northern and Central Italy in 1944 and 1945.

The Communists, thus, took

over the local leadership of the Resistenza Armata (Armed Resistance)
and became identified as the leadership of the Italian Resistance.

This

would, for the future, be a most important event because the organizational structure and expertise developed in their underground years
would provide that very organization and expertise needed by them as
a political party in postwar parliamentary Italy.
Finally, the third area of discussion in this chapter deals with
the Togliatti leadership from abroad and its clandestine efforts within
13

Tarrow, p. 105.
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the peninsula.
activities.

The years 1926 through 1941 are the framework for these

First a general outline of the period will aid in establish-

ing a needed perspective.

Secondly, three important occurrences taking

place during this period will be discussed as further evidence of the
PCI's increasing strength, which will culminate in its strength as a
political reality in post-armistice Italy, and in its leadership role
in the Resistenza Armata.
In 1926 Palmira Togliatti happened to be in the Soviet Union
attending the Seventh Plenum; he, thus, unlike many other fellow
Communists, escaped arrest.

The Plenum appointed him to be in charge of

the Party Secretariat of the Italian Communist Party, and as its leader
he carried on party activities from outside of Italy, chiefly from
Zurich and Paris.

The main thrust of activity was to reorganize party

activities on a clandestine basis in Italy.

This included sending men

secretly into the peninsula to carry out the organization.

Underground

operations made rapid progress in Lombardy, Tuscany, Emilia, Piedmont,
Rome and Southern Italy.

In Milan itself L'Unith had a circulation of

5,ooo. 14
In 1927, however, Mussolini launched his counterattack against
the Communists, and over the next few years he was able to succeed in
crippling, if not bringing to a virtual standstill, the operations of
th e PCI.

He established the OVRA (Inspectorate of Public Security)

to carry out his anti-Communist campaign.

15

Togliatti, in his Le Parti

14

Fulvio Bellini, "The Italian CP Part I: The Transformation of a
Party 19 21-1945," Problems of Communism, V (January-February, 1956), p. 41.
15 r he OVRA (Opera Vigilanza Repressione Antifascista) was th e
secret political police. It was established in 1926 at the initiative
of Mussolini.

14
Communiste, speaks of this when he observes that many of the prisoners -some of them young and some women--caught by Mussolini's security forces
were tortured until they were dead or had gone crazy.

16

By 1928

dozens of Communists had fallen into the Fascist net; in March of that
year at Marina di Pisa the entire staff of the underground located
within Italy was arrested.

This turned out to be a decisive blow

against the Communists for the short run; though the PCI center in
France endeavored to substantially revitalize the resistance in Italy,
they met with little or no success.

The OVRA kept up a continual

operation of capturing those new men sent in from the outside. 17

By

mid-1934 Mussolini's efforts had reduced the PCI to a campaign which had
as its main concentration the propagandizing of party members outside
of Italy, namely in France and the United States.

18

From 1936 through 1938, many Italian Communists fought against
Franco and his Italian and German allies in the Spanish Civil War; the
ramifications of this activity will be pointed out a little later in
this chapter.
1939-1941.

A final note in this general outline concerns the years

As was mentioned earlier, in 1939 the Soviet Union entered

into a non-Aggression pact with Germany .

When this occurred the PCI was

forced to follow Russia's lead and thus to declare a moratorium on its
anti- Axis maneuvers and propaganda.

The Nazi attack on the Soviet

Union in June of 1941, however, ended the Non-Aggression Pact, and
16

Palmira Togliatti, Le Parti Communiste Italien, trans. Robert
Paris (Paris, 1961), p. 86.
17

Bellini, p. 41.

18
Bellini, p. 41.
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Togliatti and his followers could once again pick up their activities
against the Fascists which they promptly and forcefully did.

With this

cursory background, a second area of importance concerning the Togliatti
leadership from abroad can now be examined.
Three significant events took place in this time period which,
as was laid out above, culminated in strengthening the PCI's position
in post-armistice Italian politics and in the Resistenza Armata.

The

fi.rst event was the signing of a "unity of action" agreement between
the Coilllilunists and the Socialists.

This occurred in August, 1934, and

its significance lies in the fact that with its creation was established
the rivalry between the PCI and the Giustizia e Libert~ (Justice and
Liberty). 19

A brief digression in order to provide background for this

"unity of action" agreement is warranted at this point.

As has been pointed out earlier, when Mussolini outlawed other
political parties there were two choices for those who were militantly
against him and his Fascist rule.

One choice was to remain in Italy in

the underground; inherent in this choice was the great possibility of
arrest and confino (internment).

The second choice was to leave Italy

and fight the Fascists from the outside.

Many of those who chose the

latter emigrated to France, a country which had been openly friendly
to the residence of these revolutionary elements.

There were, thus, many

different persuasions of political philosophy to be found in Paris
during the late 1920's.

In 1927 these exiled Italians formed the

Concentrazione antifascista (Anti-Fascist Concentration) which was
composed of two schools of Italian socialism, the Republicans and a
19
p. 113.

H. Stuart Hughes, The United States and Italy (Cambridge, 1953),

16
number of anti-Fascist Liberals.

20

The Concentrazione was a loosely

organized structure and one definitely not militant enough for some.
In 1929 one of these men, Carlo Rosselli, formed the movement called
Giustizia e Libert~ which was attracted to democratic ideals as well as
to some of the welfare ideas promoted by the socialists.

Its ideological

framework rested upon what Rosselli termed "Liberal Socialism. 1121

At

first Giustizia e Libert~ worked separately from the Concentrazione.
There were two main divergencies of thought between the two elements:
they could not agree on an analysis of why Fascism had conquered in
Italy, and Rosselli's followers preached an active involvement in
clandestine activities while they accused the others involved in the
Concentrazione of wiling away time arguing about various resolutions
on what to do.

Finally, in 1931 the Rosselli group did ally itself

with the Concentrazione, but other events and pressures were already in
process which would cause that entire group to break up early in 1934.
Mussolini and his OVRA, mentioned above, were beginning to make rapid
headway in smashing the underground activity in Italy; this, along with
the internal conflicts, caused the final breakup.

Something else

happened in 1934, however, and this is what was the beginning of the
20

Shepard B. Clough and Salvatore Saladino, A History of Modern
Italy Documents, Readings, and Commentary (New York, 1968), p. 522.
21

Rosselli's "Liberal Socialism" was an endeavor to shape a theory
of modern socialism which was free of Marxist determinism. Rosselli
was openly critical of the Marxist theory of the inevitability of the
class struggle and of the final revolut i on. He tried to establish a
link between the early liberal tradition of the R:!. sorgimento, from
which he evolved his ideas of freedom and demo cracy, and socialist demands
for the reform of Italian society.

17

turn towards the Communists as the eventual leaders of the antiFascist forces.
The Communists, as should have been noted, had remained isolated
from the intrigues ·of the Giustizia ~Libert~ and the Concentrazione.
They considered the methods used by these other anti-Fascists as "the
expression of an amateurish activism and an indication of lack of

.
22
seriousness."

Their argument was that the struggle against Fascism

was one that had to be carried out through the use of propaganda and
agitations and strikes.

They also recognized that the struggle should

be waged by both workers and peasants together, and they were committed
to the importance of those willing to struggle from within the under23
ground in Italy where there was direct contact with the people.
In
1934, as a result of the break up of the Concentrazione, and with the
Socialists again on their own, the two wings of that party--the
maximalists and the moderates--were able to come to an agreement and
join forces.

In August the unified Socialists signed their "unity of

action" agreement with the Communists.

Thus, in 1934, with the break

up of the Concentrazione marking the end of a loose unity of the
anti-Fascist political parties, and with the striking disagreement
between the Communists and the followers of Rosselli in Giustizia e
Libertk being apparent, the two main forces in the Italian anti-Fascist
movement had squared off against each other.

The Spanish Civil War

from 1936 to 1939 "was to provide the stage for thei r rivalry-and
for the eventual triumph of the Marxist bloc.
22

.. 24

Giuliano Procacci, History of the Italian People (New York,
1968), p. 361.
23

Procacci, p.361.

2 4aughes, p. 113.
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The second event concerning the growing strength of the PCI, then
is the ground gained by the Communists in the Spanish Civil War.

In

this war Italians from all persuasions of anti-Fascist thought joined
the ranks to fight Franco.

Two things happened:

First, amateur

fighters gained experience and became seasoned soldiers.

This would have

great significance later when these soldiers would form the ranks of
the Resistenza in Italy.

Second, the Communists clearly took over the

leadership position among the anti-Fascist forces in this struggle.
"By the ruthless use of the superior organization and material means
at their disposal, the Communists had squeezed out or suppressed their
rivals. 1125

The Communists who had all along been advocating active

struggle seized the opportunity which came before them in Spain.
They organized and took control of the International Brigades in
which Italians were predominant.

It is true that they did not control

all of the Brigades; there were commanders who were from Giustizia e
Libert~.

But the Communists held the most key positions, and they saw

to it aggressively that they were an influencing factor wherever they
were within the organization of the struggle.

26

Luigi Longo and Giuseppe Di Vittorio were both Communists and
both very influential in the Spanish campaign .

Their roles further

point out the significance of the part played by the Communists in the
Spanish Civil War:

it was their experience gei ned i n Spain which

would form the backbone for the organizing of
northern and central Italy.
25

Hughes, p. 113.

26
27

Hughes, P. 114.
Hughes, p. 114.
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t ~e

partisan movement in

With the excepti0u of individuals,

19
Giustizia ~ Libert~ proved to be a weak counterpart to the Communists in
the Spanish War.

Rosselli did form a small unit of his followers, but

they paled in comparison to the aggressive tactics of the Communist-led
groups.

Rosselli himself left the campaign in 1937 for health reasons

and was killed in Normandy by agents contracted to the Italian government.
His death severely weakened any opposition to the Couununist-Socialist
alliance, and this alliance was now in control of the anti-Fascist
forces outside of Italy.

28

The last section of this chapter has attempted to point out how
the PCI through a gradual process gained strength and prestige during
the Fascist regime.

Two events have been discussed:

the 1934 pact

between the Communists and the newly reconstituted Socialist Party and
the part played by the Communists in the Spanish Civil War.

A third and

final point concerning this process needs to be included in this discussion.
1941.

This third point centers on the atmosphere inside Italy in

It was ripe for the resumption of underground activity, and the

astute Communists took definite advantage of this fact.

The Italian

people had not favored Italy's entry into the war in 1940.

This factor

of an unpopular war effort, coupled with the general public apathy,
made conditions in Italy responsive to the renewed underground effort
aggressively pushed by the Couununists.

29

In the fall of 1941, with the

Soviets entering the war, and with the smell of Fas c ist defeat in the
air, the Communists began their seige.

Party organizers were sent into

Italy and into the factories of the major northern ci t ies where they set
28

29

Hughes, p. 114.
Bellini, p. 42.
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up cells and began the process of education, beginning with propaganda
preaching the defeat of Fascism.

This organization in 1941 would be

the groundwork for strikes and agitation later in 1943, and again in
1944, when the Communists and the Resistance were beginning to close
in on Mussolini.
In July, 1941 Togliatti and his Communists sent Umberto Massola,
a 37 year old Piedmontese worker and a member of the PC! external center
to Italy.

His task was to make contact with small Communist groupings

which had somehow maintained their existence in Mussolini's Italy, and
to renew their activities within the framework of the Togliatti Party
still headquartered for the present outside of Italy.

Massola reached

Milan, and he began to lay the groundwork for the reestablishment of
the PCI within the peninsula.

He was successful in establishing the

printing and distribution of L'Unitk the party newspaper.

It rapidly

gained circulation, and it thus provided a viable means to educate
the people and to coordinate plans for the defeat of Mussolini.

"By

the end of 1941, the PCI could once more be regarded as an effective
political organization within Italy."

30

Bellini, p. 42.
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CHAPTER III
THE PCI

SEPTEMBER, 1941-JULY, 1943:
A TIME FOR AGITATION

Under the provisions of the Rome-Berlin Axis, Italy entered the
war on June 10, 1940.

Almost immediately the initiative was wrested

from her grip; in the Mediterranean her underequipped armies yielded
a disastrous performance, and in both the Balkans and North Africa she
had to be buttressed with German reinforcement, even then suffering
formidable defeat in the end.

As

its defeat progressed outside of Italy,

so too did the internal demise of the Fascist regime proceed.

As

its power

began to crumble, attempts towards i t s sabotage gradually increased.
The group which was to capture the le2.d ''in rallying the forces of
revolt" against the Fascists was the PCl .

It has already been noted

above that the Communists during the years 0 f '.:h ei!:· exile from Italy
had gained strength and experience and p r estige duough their involvement
in Popular Fronts, their military

activiti e ~

and their intrepid and dogged efforts i n
clandestine cells within Italy.

_·.n t ;.e 5panish Civil War,

o~;~anj z i.l~ g

and maintaining

The PCI in 1_9 i•l, then, was the one

group which had worked for and had galne<l nor.gani zational preeminence"
among those Italians who were anti-Fasc:.st.
The focal point for the PCI in

r a J. ~

yi.11.g t:1e forces of revolt

was the working classes who comprised t h e +:v:.de union movement in the
lH. Stuart Hughes, The United State.s anc :'.. taly (Cambridge, 1953),
p. 175.
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industrial cities of the North.

In the fall of 1941 encouraged by the

entry of the Soviets into the war and the seemingly imminent downfall
of the Fascists, the Communists renewed with vigor their abandoned
underground struggle against Mussolini's regime, due to the devastating
effect of Mussolini's secret police. 2

They sent party organizers into

the factories of the large industrial cities to set up clandestine
cells and to begin the spread of propaganda for the defeat of the
.
3
Fasc1sts.

Their organizational abilities did not go unrewarded.

During the latter part of 1942 and in the first four months of 1943,
the Communists initiated and directed a long series of work stoppages
which succeeded in disrupting war production in Italian factories,
and which climaxed in the 1943 strike at the large Fiat plant in Turin. 4
The most important events to be recorded in the history of anti-Fascism
between June, 1940 and Mussolini's fall were these strikes which occurred
in the spring of 1943."

5

The 1943 strikes, though they were not the

2

See Chapter II, concerning the effect of the OVRA on the
clandestine movement within the Italian peninsula during the 1930s.
3

The party organizers were very task oriented. It is true that in
numbers they were a minority--of 21,000 workers in the Fiat-Mirafiori
plant only 80 were members of the Party, 30 at Lancia, 72 at Aeronautica,
and 60 at Viberti--; yet, they were most efficient and proved themselves
worthy adversaries to the endless Fascist police inside and outside the
factories. (Roberto Battaglia, Storia della Resistenza italiana, ed.
Giulio Einaudi (Torino, 1964), p. 49.)
4

.

In factories in the cities of Turin and Milan, workers had struck
ten times between August and December, 1942 even though it was prohibited
by the Fascists.
(Maurice F. Neufeld, Italy: School for Awakening
~ountries (Ithaca, 1961), p. 449.)
5Elizabeth Wiskemann, "The Italian Resistance Movements," Survey of
International Affairs, 1939-1946, ed. Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee,
Vol.: Hitler's Europe (London, 1954), p. 329.
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first which had been launched against the Fascist regime, were indeed
important in that they . demonstrated the present and the potential depth
of feeling and action which could be aroused against the continuation
of the war and for the downfall of Fascism.
another reason as well:

They were important for

the strikes "gave the PCI virtual control of

the working classes," and with this control the Party achieved a lever
which enabled it to deal with the other Italian political parties on a
basis more equal than it had previously been.

6

The first significant strike effort of the war began some days
prior to the actual outbreak of strike activity.

Instructions were handed

out by organizers on the 20th of February, and on March 5th demonstrations
commenced at the Mirafiori-Fiat plant in Turin.

The immediate demand

called for the Fascists to keep their promise of

co~pensation

workers who had been bombed-out.

7

for those

The authorities attempted to react

calmly, but exactly one week after the March 5 demonstrations, the Mirafiori workers went out on strike.
They downed tools and walked out, demanding full payment of the
sum which had been voted to them for the cost of evacuation (equal
to the pay for 192 hours of overtime), and shouting in unison: 8
'We want a subsidy for the high cost of living! We want peace!'
6

Fulvio Bellini, "The Italian CP Part I: The Transformation of a
Party 1921-1945," Problems of Communism, V (January-February, 1956), p. 42.
7

Though this was the immediate demand, the workers had many
grievances: the economic chaos caused by the war, the ever-increasing
gap between wages and prices, "worsening condi tions in the factories, and
the feeling of helplessness on the patt of workers to defend their
families and themselves from the bombfo.g raids carried out by the British
and the Americans." (Roberto Battaglia, T:ne Story of the Italian
Resistance, trans. Peter CUDllllins (LondL·n;· l957), p. 32.)
8

Roberto Battaglia, The Story of t he ~ t alian Resistance, trans.
Peter Cummins (London, 1957), p. 33.
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On March 13th the strikers achieved some results; 300 lire was offered
to every man who would go back to work and "maintain discipline."
With this the strike in Turin abated, though some of its leaders were
arrested and put to death.

9

The strikes, however continued outside of

Activity spread to other large factories in Piedmont, then to

Turin.

those in Lombardy, Liguria, and the lower Po Valley.

In the city of

Milan the strikers succeeded in closing down the Pirelli, Breda, Borletti,
and Marelli factories.

In all of these locations the Fascists were forced

to come to terms with the workers by granting them the increases in
wages they demanded.

10

For the Fascists the 1943 strikes
Italy:

s~gnaled

a new phenomenon in

an effective organized opposition to their rule.

serve to make this clear.

Two points

First, it was the first time that the

Fascists had experienced a powerful demonstration which was directed
against them, and they were not able to deal satisfactorily with it.
The Fascists, though they employed police both inside and outside the
factories, were unable to break the strikes and had to acquiesce to
the demands of the workers.

When, on the 2nd of April, they announced

that an increase in pay would be forthcoming, they pointedly added that
they had decided to pay each person a little extra in celebration of
the April 21 anniversary of the founding of Rome.

This only served to

point out further the weak position from whicP they were then operating.
"Behind this demagogic pretext, it
check it had so suddenly received."

concea J~ c

11

9 .
W1skernann, Survey of International
10

its impotent fury at the

A~_:f?i r s,

p. 329.

Neufeld, p. 449.

11 Battaglia, The Story of the Italian Resistance, p. 33.
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The second item which makes clear the impact of the 1943 strikes on
the Fascist regime deals with the long-range ramifications of the
strikes.

As the sentiment expressed in the diary of a member of the

Fascist hierarchy indicated, "the implications of the strikes could
not be laughed off •.. for now that the workers had won an economic round
against the dictatorship, they probably would turn next to political
goals. 1112

The strike action of 1943 and the tumult it caused instilled

in the workers a confidence in themselves as a force with which to be
reckoned.

Because of their impact in Piedmont, Lombardy, Liguria, and

other places in the North, they now moved in force from a position
of defense to one of offense:

the workers realized their own combative

capability vis-a-vis the Fascists.

For the first time the overthrow

of the regime by their own hands became a possibility and not merely a
13
hope.
On the eve of the March strikes those same leftist leaders
(the Cormuunists, the Socialists, and the Actionists) who had initiated
them and who would carry them out, met together at Lyons in France and
affirmed their desire to proceed in the task of destroying the political,
economic, and social elements which had made Fascism possible, reestablishing democracy in Italy, and rebuilding the state in a manner
which would ensure the supremacy of the workero. 14

Out of the conference

at Lyons came an anti-Fasci&t document which for the first time recognized
12

Charles F. Delzell, Mussolini's Enemies
Fascist Resistance (Princeton, 1961), p. 209 . ·

13

Battaglia, Storia della

The Italian Anti-

Resistenz~ 1:.~!~ an a,

p. 50.

14A description of the Socialist Party (~SIUP ) and of the Action
Pa rty (PdA) is included in Chapter IV.
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v

explicitely and unanimously the need for a national insurrection
pledged to overthrow the enemy.

It called for demonstrations in the

streets, strikes to sabotage war production, the organization of partisan
groups to fight the enemy, and in general, for the Italian people to
affirm themselves anti-Fascist by taking up arms and striking out at
the Germans and the Fascists wherever and whenever possible. 15
the political goals would follow.

Indeed

The Resistance movement with its

partisans and Committees of National Liberation in the North, as well as
the Central Committee of National Liberation at Rome, would provide the
16
d e f eat o f t h e Fascists.
.
'
necessary 1 ea d ers hi p f or t h e u 1 timate
In addition to l'urto (the impact) which the March strikes had
on the Fascist regime they also strengthened the Italian Communist Party
in a political sense.

Throughout 1941 and 1942 the Communists had done

their job and had demonstrated their skills and their perseverance in
organizing and mobilizing the workers in the factories.

Even more

important than this, however, was their ability to know and to express
the needs of the workers and their discerning aptitude to choose just
the right moment when to arouse the key potential force of the working
classes, that of solidarity.

The Communists as has already been pointed

out made the most of this aptitude:

the 1943 general strikes through-

out northern Italy, which were the culmination of two years of hard work
at organizing and mobilizing, gained for them wna t amounted to effective
control over the working masses.

With t-.h :ts control established, the

PCI next sought to consolidate forces in ar; ef fort to carry out the
15
16

Battaglia, Storia della
See Chapters IV and V.

Resis t enza _i ~_?__li~na, p. 51.
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pledge promulgated at the Lyons meeting.

In the spring of 1943 the Party

sent a delegation to Rome to confer with representatives of the monarchy
and the army.

The PCI suggested that all three forces join together in

an effort to overthrow the Fascists.

It guaranteed that it could suspend

work in all the factories of Turin, Milan, and Genoa.

From the beginning

the CoUDllunists made it clear to the representatives from the South that
they were operating from a base of strength and not from one of weakness.
In return for their ability to drastically damage Axis war production
as part of the effort to overthrow Fascism, the PCI leadership wanted
the assurance that the future anti-Fascist government would drop any
discrimination against it as a viable political party. 17

It was

precisely because the PCI had stabilized its leadership, through the
March strikes, over the working classes of the North that it was willing
to risk carrying on negotiations with the monarchy and the army.
Without that base [the control of the working classes) any
offer or proposal indicated inevitably the acceptance of its
[the PCI] own subordination to the initiative of the monarchy.
With that base, the operation assumed instead the character
of an endeavor to use the Crown for its own ends and the danger
of being used [by the King) instead, if even existent, was
reduced to the minimum possibility.18
Though PCI leadership had been achieved in the North, this fact did
not produce immediate results.

The Party's offer to aid the King and

his forces in Rome was met with resistance and inaction.

The Christian

Democrats were uncertain about the Communists and tended not to trust
them.

The Liberals, surprised by their attitude, had difficulty

convin cing themselves of the CoUDllunists' sinceri ty.

17
18

Battaglia, Storia della Resistenza

~~aliana,

In the end the

p. 54.

Battaglia, Storia della Resistenza italiana, p. 53.
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Roman leaders seemed to shy away from a plan "so explicit and so binding."
The talks hung in the air and no decision was reached.

As

late as

July 20, 1943, in a final effort, the Communists sent a mission,
headed by Ludovico Geymont and Concetto Marchesi, to Rome to try once
more to reach an agreement.

They informed the leaders there of the

unanimous desire on the part of the anti- Fascist Committee of Milan
to proceed alone in its plans for insurrection if no help was forthcoming. 19

Five days later the Italian situation had changed radically;

on July 25, King Victor Emmanuel III summoned Mussolini and dismissed
. f rom power. 20
h 1m

19

Bat t aglia, Storia della Resistenza italiana, p. 53.

2011 with the fall of Mussolini on Jul y 25, 1943, and the conclusion
of a separat e armistice between Italy and the Allies on September 8, the
Communists emerged as the strongest polit1ca :1. fo rce in central and
northern Italy. Scores of experienced Communist l eaders, released from
Fascist prisons and penal islands unde r the amnes t y ordered by the
Badoglio Government a month before the armis tice , r esumed their place in
the party and further increased its efficlen cy . " (Bellini, p. 42.)

CHAPTER IV

THE PCI AND POLITICS

JULY, 1943-DECEMBER, 1945:

A TIME FOR CONCILIATION
The period from summer 1943 through spring 1945 was one of
rebuilding and resistance in Italy.

In the North the partisan forces

were fighting to drive the Fascists and the Germans out of Italy.

In

the South, the newly formed Italian government was struggling to begin
the task of rebuilding the country.

While the Italian Communists

were fighting "the war of movement" in the North, the Italian Communist
Party was fighting the "war of position" in the South. 1

A close

look at the internal politics in Italy during this period reveals that
the PCI's goal was to continue to participate in the government and
from there to broaden its base of political power, as opposed to
pursuing intransigent revolutionary methods.

The Party was more

interested in debating issues and working out solutions to problems
within a parliamentary framework than concentrating on the immediate
annihilation of the system and the establishment of the dictatorship
of the proletariat.
Putting aside the revolutionary 'maximalism ' of its origins,
the PCI's policy was flexible and accommodating : the party carefully avoided getting involved or committed on questions of
1

The story of the part played by the Commtmists in the Resistenza
Armata will be considered in Chapter V. The present chapter will
discuss the role taken by the PCI during a per i od when it participated
i n the Italian government.
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principle and ideology, preferring the substantial political
advantages to be achieved by viable tactics.2
I. BACKGROUND
The explosive forces in Italy, feeding on the inefficient,
corrupt, moribund, Fascist state, were set in motion on the afternoon of
July 24, 1943 when the Fascist Grand Council met and by a majority of
19 to 7 voted to restore all military and constitutional power to the
King Victor Emmanuel III.

3

This sealed the fate of Mussolini; the

resolution in effect called for the ousting of the Fascist leader,
and of the regime.

On the morning of the 25th the King had appointed

Marshall Pietro Badoglio to take over the reins of the government as
Prime Minister. 4

Mussolini, in conference with Vittorio Emmanuel later

in that same day, learned of his dismissal, which was promptly followed
by his arrest.

He was transferred to Ponza and later to Gran Sasso,

high in the Apennines.

On

September 12th Captain Otto Skorzeny with

ninety Nazi paratroopers "swooped down to rescue Mussolini. •. 11 5

He

was quickly transported to Hitler's headquarters where the German
leader informed him that if he wished to return to Italy he must
establish a new pro-Nazi government, try the members of the Grand Council
2Giuseppe Manunarella, Italy After Fascism
1943-1965 (Notre Dame, 1966), pp. 69-70.

A Political History

3The Fascist Grand Council was the supreme body of both the state
and the Fascist party.
4 Ironically Badoglio had served as a soldier under the rule of
Mussolini. He was, in fact, one of those who in 1928 approved Mussolini's
parliamentary reorganization plan, when it was put to a vote in the
Senate.

5 charles F. Delzell, Mussolini's Enemies
Resistance (Princeton, 1961), p. 261.
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who had engineered his ouster, and acquiesce to the German occupation
of several border provinces.

As a result, on the 16th of September,

1943, Mussolini announced over Radio Munich to the Italian people the
organization of the Partito Fascista Repubblicano (Fascist Republican
Party), along with the main points of the program of the Fascist Social
Republic.

The attempt to rebuild a new Fascist state complete with

Fascist army had begun.

Meanwhile, for the Allies and for the Badoglio

contingent, political and military events were also moving, sometimes
not with as much speed as was desired.
On July 10 the Allies had landed in Sicily, and one week later

the Allied Military Government had come into existence in Italy. 6

Before

the end of July, martial law had been proclaimed in Italy, Badoglio
had formed a Cabinet, and the Fascist Party had been outlawed.

The

armistice agreement between the Badoglio government and the AngloAmericans, however, was not reached with comparable alacrity.

Mussolini's

government had fallen July 25; yet, the armistice was not agreed upon
until September 8.

The negotiations for the armistice were convoluted

and drawn-out for perhaps two reasons.

First, the Anglo-Americans were

not prepared for what they considered the early fall of Mussolini;
consequently, they were not ready for the problems contingent upon
Italy's request for an armistice.

The representatives of the Allies,

for example, would not discuss with the Italians anything regarding
future peace-treaty conditions.

They also refused to talk about final

6There were two Allied governmental structures in Italy. The
Allied Military Government (AMG) was established in Sicily on July 17,
1943. The Allied Control Connnission (ACC) was established in Brindisi
on November 10, 1943. The ACC and its operations were usually carried
on to the rear of the battle lines while the AMG functioned in the forward
zones under the direct connnand of the local Army Headquarters.

33
territorial settlements, the pre-Fascist colonies, and the future size
of the Italian army.

Second, the Italian government appeared to be

too "optimistic" about the terms of the armistice.

The Italians in general

expected gentle treatment at the hands of their former enemies.

The

King and his advisers had been persuaded, probably as a result of
Allied propaganda, that the elimination of the Fascist regime by the
Italians themselves would effectively modify the Allied attitude of a
harsh peace for Italy.

7

The fact remains that Marshal Badoglio had already by midAugust set on footsteps towards the conclusion of an armistice
with the Allies, while at the same time playing the difficult
8
game of keeping the Germans in the dark as to Italian intentions.
The important focus for this work, however, is not the machinations
of either the Anglo-Americans or the Italians in their efforts to achieve
an armistice.

The important point is the negotiations were allowed to

drag on from July to September.

The Badoglio government failed to

realize that the German reaction to a separate armistice on the part of
Italy would have indeed been a violent one, and consequently failed to
take any steps that might have mitigated the reaction.
Instead of prompt and determined action, Badoglio delayed the
start of negotiations with the Allies and gave the Germans, who
with Mussolini's fall had become highly suspicious of the
Italians, enough time to send more troops to Italy. By the
end of August, a month after the dictator's collapse, the
Germans had enough forces in Italy to be able to control any
move of the Italian Army.9
7

Mammarella, p. 22.

8
Muriel Grindrod, The New Italy
(London, 1947), p. 9.
9
Maunnarella, pp. 21-22.
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It is a fact that on July 25 when Mussolini fell, only seven divisions
of German soldiers were present in Italy.

Added to this, Badoglio

and his government had some modest strength available in the Italian
home reserves and in the entire population, including Fascists who
had not reacted negatively to the July 25 overthrow. 10
At this point it is significant to emphasize the importance of
the following two factors.

First, by the middle of September, 1943

Italy had within its borders three different functioning governments.
In the South, the Allied Military Government under the direct command
of the local Allied Army Headquarters had been established in Sicily on
17 July.

As the Allied forces fought their way northward, the AMG also

moved northward.

In Rome, the King and Marshal Badoglio had formed the

Italian anti-Fascist government, with Badoglio convening his first
cabinet on July 26.

11

In the North, on the 16th of September Mussolini

had announced the formation of his new Fascist Social Republic in his
desperate effort to re-establish the Fascist state with the help of
Hitler and Germany.

On Septemb.er 23 he announced his new cabinet,

and his government took up residence in Salo, a small town on the western
shore of Lake Garda not far from Verona.

The second observation to

be made is that Italy was a country divided.

By the end of September,

1943, it had become painfully clear to the Italians that, though an
armistice had been reached, the war for them was not over.

The Allies

having landed in Sicily and Salerno and on the Adriatic coast, had control
10

Mammarella, p. 21.

11

On September 10 the Germans occupied Rome. King Victor Emmanuel
and Marshal Badoglio fled further south to Bari from which they continued
to run the Italian government under the direction of the AMG.
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of most of the South.

The Germans, due in great part to Badoglio's

delays, had infiltrated and now controlled the northern and central
parts of Italy as an occupying army, and had on September 10 occupied
the city of Rome.

In October the Italians

decl~red

war on Germany,

becoming a co-belligerent of the Allies, but it would not be until
spring of 1945 that Italy itself was liberated.

12

Italy is a relatively young nation; she achieved unification only
by 1870.

It can be reasonably posited that the short fifty years

which intervened between 1870 and the coming of Fascism in 1922 did
not supply enough time "to establish the habit of parliamentary method
111 3
.
. .
. practice.
.
an d to tra i n a generation
o f po li ticians
verse d i n democratic
Italy can be likened to a young child growing up and learning one set
of values, when Fascism came on the Scene and arrested that growth and
development.

As has already been noted earlier, those people, and more

to the point, those politicians who disagreed with the Fascist experience
either went into exile, were arrested, or simply took no part in public
life.

All of these men who had been active in government and who would

be active again in the post-Fascist era, came back to governmental life
after twenty years of inactivity within the Italian state structure.
one element they had in common was their anti-Fascism.

The

The problems

arose when these different men, representing different political parties,
disagreed on the degree to which they desired to change Italian society

and on the kinds of changes they were willing to make.
12

The King dragged his feet on the issue of declaring war on
Germany. There were several reasons for his hesitations; these are
discussed adequately in Delzell, Mussolini's Enemies The Italian AntiFascist Resistance, pp. 315-318.
l3Muriel Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy
1945-1955 (London, 1955), p. 6.
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.•. while the revolutionaries of the twenties now planned
with renewed ardour to change everything and build afresh on
new foundations, the more cautious and orthodox aimed instead
at going back to the point where the 'wrong turning' had been
taken and resurrecting the pre-Fascist State intact.14
These differences in how to restructure Italian society in the postFascist postwar era form the foundation for the political crises which
plagued the Badoglio, Bonomi, and Parri governments in the years 1943
through 1945.

Before moving on to analysis of these crises, and in

particular before looking at the role of the PCI in these political
machinations, some specific background information is called for outlining the political parties and their arrival on the scene after
the fall of Mussolini.
II. COMITATI DI LIBERAZIONE NAZIONALE
Comitati Di Liberazione Nazionale (Connnittees of National Liberation) emerged at the beginning of 1943.
tees which had been active underground.

These were anti-Fascist commitEarly in 1943 when Mussolini's

fall was imminent, leaders from the old (pre-Fascist) opposition
parties had resurfaced.

These leaders, along with many younger men

who knew only the Fascist experience, formed in several cities AntiFascist Freedom Fronts which were the forerunners of the Committees of
National Liberation.

Together the Committees embodies the willingness

of anti-Fascist factions to put aside their political differences for
the moment and to join together to rid Italy of the new Fascist forces
of the Social Republic and the Germans, and to restructure the state along
democratic lines.
14

Very soon after the fall of Mussolini CLNs mushroomed

Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy, p. 6.
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throughout Italy--many were clandestine in nature due to German
occupation--even though the Badoglio government had officially prohibited
any organized political activity.
in many cities:

Beginning with Rome, CLNs appeared

Milan, Turin, Florence, and elsewhere. 15

Later the

Rome organization called itself the Central CLN (CCLN) to distinguish
it from the CLNs in other cities.

Later still, the CLN in Milan changed

its name to CLN dell'Alta Italia (CLNAI), CLN for Upper Italy, in an
effort to handle more efficiently matters which affected the occupied
North, particularly the military resistance.

Despite the differences

in name, however, the CLNs represented the political spectrum, from
extreme left to extreme right, and from the beginning of their public
debut they involved themselves in a propaganda campaign to inform
people of the current situation and to encourage them to actively
participate in the changes needed.

16

At its first public meeting the

Rome CLN invoked "all Italians to the struggle and to the Resistance,
and to reconquer for Italy the place it deserves in the community of
nl7
free nations.
After the reality of the armistice, then, the CLNs proved themselves
to be a positive force; they grew in number, and most importantly, they
1511 When Ivanoe Bonomi's (member of the Labour Democracy Party)

Anti-Fascist Committee, meeting in a house on Via Adda early in the
morning of September 9, 1943, heard the news of the royal-military
government's "hegira" to Brindisi, it sought to fill the political
void. At the suggestion of Labor Democrat Ruini, it voted that afternoon
to rename itself the Committee of National Liberation (CLN), in the
style of the French CLN that had been crganized in Algiers a few months
earlier." (Delzell, p. 271.)
16

Mammarella, p. 36.

17

Delzell, p. 273.
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appeared in all of Italy--in the South and in the occupied central and
northern areas of the peninsula.

The Rome CLN laid the groundwork for

the first active resistance against the invading Germans.

In the

liberated South the CLNs provided the focus for political activity.
In the northern and central portions of the country the Committees
resorted to secret activities in their fight against the German and
Fascist troops.
In both cases they symbolized the union of all anti-Fascist
forces, different with regard to ideological background and
political programs, but all equally determined to act together
for the rehabilitation of Italian society from its Fascist
past.18
III. THE POLITICAL PARTIES
By early fall in 1943 there were six (in some regions more)
major political parties represented in the CLNs of southern and central
Italy and five parties represented in the North. 19

These parties,

after an absence of twenty years from the Italian political scene,
once again openly resumed activity.

They were able--at least during

the two year period until total liberation--to combine and work together
in a connnon effort to solve Italy's immediate probelms.

From right to

left the CLN parties were the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the Democratic
Labor Party (PDL), Christian Democracy (CD), the Action Party (PdA),
the Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP), and the Italian Connnunist Party (PCI).
18
Mannnarella, p. 36.

19
Mammarella, p. 36.
20 Delzell, p. 207. PSIUP stands for Socialist Party of Proletarian
Unity (Partito Socialista di Unita Proletaria). This was the official
"denomination" of the Socialist Party from 1943 until 1947.

20
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The one party not represented in the CLNs of northern Italy was the
Democratic Labor Party; the followers of this small political group
were almost entirely based in the South.

The essential characteristics

of these parties in the Italian political spectrum in 1943 are summarized
as follows:
The Italian Liberal Party (?LI)
The Liberal Party was the furthest to the right of the CLN
parties.

It was also the oldest of them in terms of political exper-

ience and historical tradition.

It can be traced back to the Risorgi-

mento, "not so much as an organized party in the modern sense but rather
as a current of ideas or a political orientation. 1121

The political

class which was responsible for the Risorgimento and which held
political supremacy in Italy from 1860 to the coming of Fascism was
liberale.
This term does not correspond conceptually to that of the
American "liberal"; it must be considered within the framework
of Europe in the second half of the 19th century. Liberalism
in that period meant acceptance of parliamentary democracy,
laissez faire principles in economy, the recognition of the
fundamental freedoms, tempered, however, by the necessity to
safeguard and maintain a political system from which the working
classes were excluded. In Italy, the Liberal Party provided
the cadres for the ruling class which, having initially started
from the progressive positions of the Risorgimento ~eriod,
ended in a conservative defense of its privileges. 2
This conservative orientation asserted itself once again when the PLI
first emerged as "a full-fledged party" in the fall of 1943.
2

~mmarella, p. 37.

22
23

Mammarella, pp. 37-38.
Delzell, pp. 219-220.

23
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When it did return to the scene in 1943, as a political group,
it returned with considerable prestige.
number of very outstanding intellectuals:

It had within its ranks a
Benedetto Croce, Giolitti,

Vittorio Orlando, Antonio Salandra, Luigi Einaudi, and Francesco
Ruffini.

These were men who voiced "magnificent scorn of Fascism."

The

following words, inspired by Croce, and read at the first congress of the
reconstruct~d

Liberal Party held at Naples in June, 1944 were exactly

what the CLNs and the Italian masses wanted to hear:
Fascism was a giant evil genius •.. which made bad taste a
science. It had a senile cunning in evil; it does not deserve
to be honored by involving the mythical figures of Ahriman or
Satan, for it deserves another name, more apt 2~d not imaginative
but prosaic. It should oe called human folly.
Be sides being a party of some import, the postwar PLI was a
divided party.

The conservative orientation, already mentioned above,

and a progressive orientation were coming into conflict.

This conflict

arose out of the different regional or professional backgrounds of PLI
members.

In the one camp, university professors, students, lawyers,

and other professional people were genuinely interested in promoting
progressive ideas.

They sensed the times in which they were living and

"were well aware of the necessity of orienting the country toward a
25
modern and intelligent reformism."
In the other camp, landowners,
mostly from the South, and small or big businessmen composed the
24

Margaret Carlyle, Modern Italy (New York, 1965), p. 65.
Benedetto Croce was a world renowned philosopher who remained in
Italy during the years of Fascism. Throughout the r egime he continued
to publish his journal La Critica which was highly critical of Mussolini
and Fascism. He was not harmed probably because of his reputation.
He was a Southerner and, of course, a member of the PLI .
25

Mammarella, p. 40.
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conservative orientation of the party.

These particular men, no

matter what liberal beliefs they cherished, "had tradition, not to say
reaction, in their bones."

26

Specifically, this faction was

in favor of the restoration of the political and social
conditions that had existed prior to Fascism. For them, the
'old values,' that is, the values of pre-World War I liberal
society, remained unchanged. Disregarding the social and historical evolution that had taken place, they thought that a return
to these v~lues would solve the problems of the new Italian
democracy. 7
Though this internal conflict within the party continued for several
years throughout the postwar years, the political position of the Liberal
Party itself remained essentially conservative and opposed to concrete
changes in society.

Many of the members demonstrated an almost exaggerated

proclivity for law and order, for legal and constitutional tradition
and practice.

Thus, a considerable proportion of the party cadres,

though not supportive of the current King, were predisposed towards
the monarchy as an institution.

28

In the realm of economics the

party line adhered to Croce's assertion that "the party of freedom
need not descent to mundane affairs and formulate a specific program."

29

In concluding, though they were staunch advocates of political liberty,
the liberali were unable to comprehend the demands for social and
economic justice exacted by the working classes; in the end they
channeled their political action towards the defense of the interests
of the upper classes.
26 Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy, p. 18.
27

Mammarella, pp 40-41.

28Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy, p. 18 .

29

Delzell, p. 220.
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The Democratic Labor Party (PDL)
This member party of the CLN was the party which was represented in
the southern and central Italian Committees but was not represented in
the North.

Its leaders were for the most part men who had been involved

in politics for a long time.

For example, Ivanoe Bonomi and Meuccio

Ruini, both leaders of the PDL in 1943, were former Socialists who had
turned their backs on the party in 1912 because their reformist
posture did not mesh with the revolutionary maximalism of the majority.
In terms of the program which they offered, the Labor Democrats
have been described as standing midway between the Action Party and the
Liberal Party.

The PDL platform was first published in Rome on July 26,

the day after the fall of Mussolini.

It called for

... popular self-government and parliamentary supremacy; •..
progressive and extraordinary taxation; the principle of the
'nation in arms'; regional autonomies; free public schooling,
even through the university; inviolability of freedom of the
press and of organization .•• [The party] favors all reforms
that may raise the dignity of labor and labor's rights with
respect to capital, [provided] that the State's e~onomic
framework be not suddenly endangered. 11 30
·
In particular, and in the main, they differed from the Actionists in
that the majority of the Labor Democrats desired to maintain the
institution of the Monarchy; in fact, they, unlike ;the Actionists,
staunchly refused to actively propagandize against the House of Savoy.
Secondly, they did not agree with the extent to which the Actionists
favored socialization.
30

31

Delzell, p. 219.

31

Delzell, p. 219.

In concluding, the program of the Democratic
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Labor Party differed only slightly from that of the mainstream parties
and because it was unable to attract a popular following; it "faded
out" after 1946. 32
Christian Democracy (CD)
The Christian Democrat Party which emerged in 1943 was the direct
heir of the Partitio Popolare Italiano (Italian People's Party), the
modern and progressive Catholic party founded by the Sicilian priest
Don Luigi Sturzo in 1919.

33

Several of the Partitio Popolare leaders

endured the years of Fascism, some in prison, others in exile.

In 1942

and 1943 they, along with fresh advocates, initiated renewed, secret
political contacts.

In these years they laid the foundation for a new

Catholic progressive party to be known as Christian Democracy.

They

supported Alcide De Gasperi as their leader and spokesman, and they
leaned heavily on the Church for help in restructuring the party
organization.
32

34

This was supplied through Catholic Action and the

Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy, p. 19.

33

The Partitio Popolare was against imperialism, insisted upon
proportional representation, the vote for women, and the breaking up of
large uncultivated estates for use among peasants. Further, it demanded
total separation of the state from Church influence and called for more
local autonomy as opposed to excessive centralization. (Mammarella, p. 52.)
34

The political career of Alcide De Gasperi predates the First
World War when he was a representative to the Austrian Congress in
Vienna from the city of Trento. Prior to the war the Austrian Empire had
under its administration the towns of Trento, Trieste, Balzano, and
Gorizia and their territories. After World War I the Italians gained
these territories, and De Gasperi was elected to represent them in the
Italian Parliament. During the Fascist years De Gasperi was persecuted
and put into prison. Upon his release from confinement, he retired to
the Vati can where he worked quietly as a librarian.
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lower clergy, the latter of which had direct contact with and reasonable
influence over the common people.
The political program of the DC in the postwar years emulated
that of the Partito Popolare.

The chief points in its platform were

the division of church and state, the authenticity of the Lateran
Agreements, the establishment of regional governments and the strengthening of communal institutions, total freedom for the workers to organize
trade unions and their right to take part in the management of businesses,
public social insurance, progressive taxation and land reform.

Especially

important to the platform was a solid statement defending Christian
values and a call for good relations with the Catholic Church.

35

The Christian Democrats succeeded in enticing into their ranks
probably the widest cross-section of the population.

There were

farmers and industrial workers (though among the working classes the
party's main strength lay in the agricultural areas) co-existing with
representatives from the petit-bourgeosie and from industrial management.
This circumstance provided the stage for a party with a definite class
character, from progressive left to the extreme right.
While the necessity of mediating between these currents
assigned a center position to the DC in the Italian political
spectrum, historical necessity and the interplay of internal
tendencies often compelled the party to swi tch alternately
from the center to the right or the left.36

An example of this was De Gasperi 1 s willingness to participate in the
government with the Communists, at least during the war years.
35

Maromarella, p. 57.

36

Mammarella, p. 57.
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firmly believed that his Catholic party was obliged to collaborate with
secular democratic forces in an effort to ensure the viability of
democracy in Italy.

37

The Action Party (PdA)
The Action Party, unlike Christian Democracy)was not the direct
heir to any political party existing prior to the twenty years under
Fascism.

In fact (although it had been in de facto existence since

July, 1942) it did not emerge as a party
ning of 1943.

w~th

a program until the begin-

A large proportion of those who formed the ranks of the

PdA had been adherents of Giustizia ~ Liberta, the political movement
founded in 1929 in Paris by Carlo Rosselli and other exiles living in
France.

38

These Actionists, through a series of underground meetings,

were finally able to agree upon a program; in July, 1942 they made
public their seven-point program:
1. Abdication of the Savoyard dynasty, co-responsible with
Fascism for the country's ruin, and establishment of a Republic;
2. Regional automony and economic equalization of the regions;
3. Nationalization on a flexible basis of large industrial
monopolies;
4. Radical agrarian reforms and land redistribution;
5. Restoration of labor union provileges to factory workers
and permission for them to share in industrial management;
6. Full religious freedom, and separation of Church and
State;
7. Promotion of a European federation of free democratic
39
states within the framework of still broader world collaboration.
The leaders of the Action Party were proposing to establish a new
party that would cut itself off from the political t raditions of the past
37
38

39

Delzell, p. 216.
.

Giustizia e Liberta is discussed in Chapter II.
Delzell, pp. 213-214.
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and would become the tool for a "liberal revolution. 11

They had as

their goal the joining together of workers and the petit bourgeoisie,
elements which had been won over by Fascist propaganda "when they had
been irritated and frightened by the Socialists and had easily succumbed
to the Fascist appeal of th.e 'party of order.'ffO

The Action Party's

official stance promulgated the idea that the working class and the small
middle-class must be educated as to where they stood:

their common

enemy was the large industrial entrepreneur who was in turn the epitome
of all the traditional conservative forces--the monarchy, the aristocracy,
the higher echelons of the army and civil service, and the higher clergy.
The Action Party was not moved by theories, as was the case with the Liberal
farty, but instead taught that each social and economic problem should
be confronted and solved in a concrete fashion, and done so with the
welfare of the masses of people in mind. 41
The Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP)
Immediately to the right of the PCI was the Italian Socialist
Party.

It had been founded in Italy in 1892, had all but disappeared

from the political scene in 1926, and reappeared once again in August of
1943.

Italian socialism got a late start--in 1892 socialism had already

taken root in France, Germany, and Britain--probably for two reasons:

40

Carlyle, p. 51.

41 carlyle, p. 51. Two outstanding political figures were members
of the Action Party: Count Carlo Sforza and Ferruccio Parri. Both of
them fought Mussolini throughout his years in power, Sforza from exile
and Parri in the underground. Both were also active in politics during
the period 1944-1945; Sforza served as Secretary for Foreign Affairs in
the first Bonomi government, and Parri was Prime Minster in 1945.
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first, the industrialization of Italy after its unification moved at a
I

very slow pace, and second, extremely backward conditions plagued the
country, particularly in the South. 42

The party did fade from the

Italian political scene after 1926, but as has already been pointed
out, so did every other party in Mussolini's regime.

The Socialists,

however, like the Christian Democrats, continued to exist and to keep
in contact during the period from 1926 to 1943; in fact, socialism was
"well represented among the exiles in France and was a movement rich
in leaders. 1143

In August, 1943 Pietro Nenni, Bruno Buozzi, and others

succeeded in re-establishing the party under the new title Partito
Socialista Italiano di Unita Proletaria (PSIUP). 44

This group named

Nenni as secretary-general and director of Avanti!, the party newspaper.
Two observations should be noted concerning the Socialist party.
The history of the party seems predicated upon conflicts between the
42

Mammarella, p. 41.

43

Carlyle, p. 58.

44

Pietro Nenni was born in 1891 and was a journalist by profession.
He published The Spectre of Connnunism in 1920, a book in which he
explained his switch to the Socialist Party (from the Republican Party).
He was an outstanding man, intensely anti-Mussolini, fighting him first
from exile and then, after August, 1943, in the undergrotmd. In that
same year he was elected President of the Socialist Party. Among his
accomplishments were the creation and responsibility for the publication
of Avanti, the clandestine newspaper, and after the war he held political
office in the Parri government and the De Gasperi government.
Bruno Buozzi was a labor leader who had been active in labor in
pre-Fascist years. He had headed the Italian Federation of Metallurgical
Workers (FIOM) and had become Secretary-General of the General Confederation of Labor (CGL). He emigrated in 1926 and re-entered Italy in
1943. He was largely responsible for the Pact of Rome agreement in 1944
which established the CGIL, a labor organization composed of Communist,
Socialist, and Christian Democratic leadership. In 1944 he was captured
and shot by the Germans.
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maximalists and the reformists.

As these two groups fought amongst

themselves, causing splinterings and break-offs from the party, during
the period between the founding and the Second World War, so these
conflicts between the maximalists and the reformists would flare up again
in the years following World War II.

For example, the moderate faction

of the party, led by Giuseppe Saragat would break away from the PSIUP
in 1947 and form the Italian Workers' Socialist Party to demonstrate
opposition "to the pro-Communist 'fusionist' tendencies of Nenni's
.
.
45
maJority faction."

The second observation to be registered concerning

the Socialist party is a comment on its activities after it had resurfaced
as a political force.

As will be seen in the following chapter, the

Socialists played an active role in the partisan resistance of central
and northern Italy, in scope and importance being second only to the
Communists.

Besides their partisan role, they were represented in the

Committees of National Liberation where they took an active, not passive,
posture.

During the time from 1943 to 1945 they were, as were the

Communists, both anticlerical and antiroyalist, though as will be seen
in the final segments of this chapter (relating to the Communists),
both they and the Communists did not accentuate their opposition because
their overriding purpose was to remain in the government.
The Italian Communist Party ' (PCI)

46

At this particular juncture it need only be indicated that
in 1945 at the beginning of the postwar era, the PCI was in an
45
Italy

shepard B. Clough and Salvatore Saladino, ~~istory of Modern
Documents, Readings, and Commentary (New York , 1968), p. 549.
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An accounting of the Italian Communist Party, more detailed
than that found above in the discussions of the other parties represented in the CLN, can be found in Chapter II of this work, "The
Communist Party in Italy 1921-1941."
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ascending position of stre ngth.

The party set out in this period already

imbued with three very enviable 11 assets. 1147

The first advantage the party

had was the existence of an organization which had remained viable from
an early stage through clandestine efforts from abroad and within
the Italian peninsula; this intact organization was superior to any
other party structure.

48

The second advantage held by the party was

growing support from the industrial working classes in the North, support
which had already been demonstrated in the factory strikes of 1943,
beginning in the Fiat-Miraf iori plant in Turin.

49

The final advantage

of the Communists was their involvement and leadership in the Resistenza
Armata.

50

IV.

ISSUES: THE BADOGLIO MINISTRIES
26 July, 1943-5 June, 1944

The chief issue to be discussed in this section, and the problems
surrounding it, occur during the period prior to April, 1944 when the CLN
finally joined the Badoglio cabinet.

The issue itself pivoted around the

Monarchy, or the institutional question as it had come to be called.
The immediate central question posed was whether the CLN would be willing
to form a government with the King Victor Emmanuel whose, in the words of
Benedetto Croce, "clear will to make use of institutions and men of
47

48

Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy, p. 15.
See Chapter II, "The Communist Party in Italy

49 see Chapter III, "The PCI
Agitation."
50

1945:

1921-1941. 11

September, 1941-July, 1943:

See Chapter V, "The PCI and the Resis t ance
A Time For Aggression."

A Time for

September, 1943-May,

50
Fascism, [and whose] •.• long delay in declaring war on Germany, made necessary his retirement.

1151

This central question concerning the monarchy

and the way in which it was treated, and in effect solved, by the PCI is
the main focus of interest in considering the Badoglio ministries from
1943 through 1944.
As was seen earlier, Marshal Badoglio had formed a cabinet almost
immediately after Mussolini had been dismissed.

As late as 1944,

however, his cabinet did not include in it any of the political parties
represented in the CLNs.

Instead, it was made up of "technical experts' '

who were carrying on as the government, in effect, as if the antiFascist parties and Colllll\ittees did not exist.

The British-American

military authorities realized that this was a situation which could not
continue; they recognized the need for a wider political base in the
government.

They therefore requested (in fact, it had been among the

conditions for the recognition of Italy as a co-belligerent that the
anti-Fascist parties be included in the government) that the King call
upon the six anti-Fascist parties to join his cabinet.

Two factors,

however, were present which caused delay in bringing about this change.
First, the King dragged his feet so to speak because he was hesitant
in having any factions in his cabinet who would not support his monarchy.
It has also been argued that Victor Emmanuel feared that with an opening
to any of the political parties, Communism would be provided with "a
logical wedge to force its way into the cabinet."
51
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Second, and most

Delzell, p. 325.

~arella, p. 61.
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Maurice F. Neufeld, Italy:
(Ithaca, 1961), p. 452.
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important for current purposes, was the trenchant resistance towards
the monarchy, either on a personal basis which was the case with the
Liberals and several others, or on an institutional basis which
was the case for the leftist parties.
of the

Christ~an

The Liberal Party, some segments

Democrats, and all of the anti-Fascist conservative

groups supported the institution of the monarchy but would have nothing
to do with either Vittorio Ennnanuel or his son, Crown Prince Umberto.
As far as they were concerned these two men had openly cooperated and
co-functioned with Mussolini and his Fascist regime, and they were
.
54
thus unacceptable as representative of the monarchy.

The feelings

of the leftist parties--the Connnunists, the Socialists, and the Actionists-took a different tack.
kind of govenunent.

They were in opposition to a monarchical

They approached their opposition from a philiso-

phical point of view, rather than from a reaction to Victor Emmanuel's
guilt by association.

To the leftists the monarchy was the symbol of

tradition, order, privilege, and Fascism.

'.flle institution itself

simply did not mesh with the socio-economic changes they proposed
for Italian society.
As

55

the year 1944 emerged, the existing Italian government found

itself unable to move forward towards meeting the British-American
54
Mammarella, p. 62.
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Delzell, p. 328. The King's answer to the accusations made
against him was that he bore no political responsibility. He maintained
that Mussolini's rise to power was the direct result of the inability
of the democratic parties to organize against him. (Mammarella, p. 63.)
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demands for inclusion of the anti-Fascist parties in the government. 56
While the conflict continued, accompanied with proposals and counter
proposals from various elements, new situations which touched on the
problem were continuing to develop.

The nari Congress which convened

on 28 January, 1944 was one of these situations.

As

the CLNs gained

more and more political voice in the liberated South, they began to
act in concert.

The Committees requested permission to convene a

national convention in Naples on December 20, 1943.

The AMG refused to

grant their request, basing their refusal on regulations prohibiting
political meetings in AMG territory.

The Allied Control Counnission,

however, quickly interceded and persuaded Marshal Badoglio to allow the
Congress to meet in the town of Bari which was in that part of Italy
occupied by the King.

The Rari Congress was important because it

signaled the first free political assembly to meet openly in Europe
since the Nazis overran the Continent.

"The congress did not, of course,

mark the birth of free political parties, but it signaled their first
dramatic bow on the public stage.

57

Bari was, however, also important

for other reasons which relate to the continuing story of conflict
discussed above.
56

nuring the conflict the AMG at different times lined up with
one or the other side. Mammarella states that the Americans definitely
favored the anti-Fascist parties, at least after Adlai Stevenson's
fact-finding report on Southern Italy had been presented to the
State Department. The British, on the other hand, representing Churchill's
attitude, were generally on the side of the monarchy. They had
little faith in the political prowess of the political parties, and
they feared extremism. (Hammarella, p. 64.)
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Delzell, p. 332.
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Two key proposals were aired at the Congress.
was introduced before actual formalities began.

58

The first proposal

It was sponsored by

the three leftist parties and set forth the manifesto that the Congress
itself was the legal Italian government, and as such, the Allies must
now deal with it instead of with_ Marshal Badoglio.

This proposal died

quickly, due in large part to the influence of Benedetto Croce.

A final

outcome, deriving from this defeated proposal, was the formation of a
junta which was comprised of representatives of the six parties, and
which acted as a standing committee of the Congress.

The importance

of the creation of this junta must not be minimized during this period
of conflict for "This [junta] was the germof the six-party coalition
of 1944-5. 1159

The second key proposal aired at the Congress--and this

one was passed--demanded the abdication of the King and called for the
institutional problem to be decided by popular vote at the end of the war.
This compromise on the viability of the monarchy was realized because
the southern PCI, "engaged at the moment in a furtive flirtation with
Badoglio, failed to give vigorous support to the leftisits' resolution."

60

5811 on a different plane, one of the most important achievements
of the Congress of Bari was the fotmdation of the Italian General
Confederation of Labor (CGIL, Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro),
which merged into the same labor organization the Counnunist, Socialist
and Christian Democratic workers unions. This act achieved a unity on
the labor front similar to that reached among different politic~! forces
already existing in the CLN. 11 (Mammarella, p. 66.)
59 w. Hilton-Young, The Italian Left A Short History of Political
Socialism in Italy (London, 1949)., p. 166.
60nelzell, p. 333. There appears to have been a difference in
attitude between the southern and northern PCI. Southern leaders
appeared to want to shelve the conflict and concentrate on driving the
Germans out of Italy. There was even a rumor that the PCI would join
the Badoglio government. The "coquetry" of the southern Counnunists
was not appreciated by their northern counterparts.
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This open willingness on the part of the PCI to bend politically can
be viewed as the first fragment of evidence that Italian Connnunism
in 1944 and in the postwar years would hold as its highest priority
participation in the Italian government.

The Togliatti return to

Italy, with his almost immediate decision on the monarchy, forms
another bit of evidence supporting this contention.
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At the conclusion

of the Bari Congress, the political parties had come together enough
to agree upon the monarchy; however, no joint cabinet had been formed.
The King still defied abdication.
The conflict over the monarchy became increasingly fierce before
it was finally (at least for the immediate future) resolved.

The

British renewed pressure to retain the monarchical institution while
the ACC Political Section worked out a specific plan for abdication.
In February, 1944 Enrico De Nicola, a political leader from Naples,
finally persuaded the King to agree to abdication in favor of his son
Prince Umberto.

Still, final agreement among all parties concerned

hung in the balance.

The left-wing parties would not accept Umberto

because of his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Italian forces in
62
It was at this point
1940 when Mussolini had declared war on France.
that Palmira Togliatti arrived in Naples from Moscow.

And it was at

this point that the PCI, under his leadership, facilitated an agreement
between King and political parties, making it possible for Marshal
Badoglio to form a cabinet with the six anti-Fascist parties in
membership.
61 Togliatti's decision concerning the monarchy will be discussed
later in this chapter.
62ailton-Young, pp. 166-167.
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Straight from th e fountainhead of authority, he swung the
communist leaders right round overnight; the communists would
henceforth be prepared to collaborate in the government with
anybody at all, with the King, with Badoglio, with black
Catholics, with laissez-faire liberals. Now was no time for
sterile gestures of disapproval; the war must be won in collaboration with anyone who was prepared to win it. At the same
time communist propaganda in Naples suddenly increased and
demonstrations became more businesslike.63
Thus, Togliatti, speaking for the PCI, voiced no objection to collaborating with Badoglio even with the King remaining on the throne.
The PCI's "realistic approach" was accepted by both the King and
.
64
the Allies.

The other political parties, if somewhat reluctantly,

also accepted the PCI attitude as workable.

The formal agreement was

reached on April 24 and was based on the De Nicola plan mentioned above.
This plan called for the transfer of all royal powers from the King to
a Lieutenant General, provided that the King would retire from the throne
without the necessity of abdicating, and ensured that Umberto, the son
of Victor Emmanuel, would become Lieutenant General. 65

Thus, a new

government was formed; it was still under the premiership of Marshal
Badoglio, but it had within its membership representation of all the
CLN parties.
Togliatti's PCI "svolta" laid the foundation for the future of
the party.

Two items are of particular note.

First, the svolta assured

the Communists of participation in the government.

In the April, 1944

Badoglio cabinet, they were given the Department of Agriculture, and
63
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Togliatti was made minister without portfolio.

66

Th.is membership in

the government continued through successive ministries (to 1947), and
provided the party with a base from which to strengthen their impact
upon the Italian people.

Second, the svolta established a pattern

of behavior for the Communists which was to continue through the years
1944 and 1945 and beyond that.

Tiley were intent upon remaining in

the government.
There was evidently going to be no more of the BombacciBordiga tradition of intransigent political virginity, but a
determination to get into the government at all costs. For the
communists, the most implacaole, incorruptible and gallant
of the anti-Fascists, to lead the way in co-operating with a
monarch who was compromised even in the eyes of a convinced
monarchist like Signor Croce was a break with tradition that
showed how far above other aims did they rate the getting of
placed in the government. They did not thereafter revise
this rating.67
In conclusion, an understanding of the circumstances which facilitated
the final agreement between Badoglio and the six anti-Fascist parties is
crucial to comprehending the behavior of the Italian Communist party in
the years 1940-1945 (and beyond).

As noted earlier the PCI, from the

moment Togliatti took command in Italy, set aside its revolutionary
intransigence and assumed a posture which was flexible and accommodating.
The party eschewed involvement or commitment on philosophfcal questions.
They opted for practical political strategy.

V. ISSUES:

THE BONOMI MINISTRIES

9 June, 1944-12 June, 1945
The presence of crises did not end with the agreement which had
brought together in the government Badoglio and the anti-Fascist
66

Manunarella, p. 69.

67 ttilton-Young, p. 168.
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parties.

Before long, in fact, the Marshal resigned, never to be Prime

Minister again.
the city.

In early June the Allies marched into Rome and liberated

At this time the De Nicola plan went into operation; the

King transferred his powers to his son who became the Lieutenant General,
and Badoglio prepared to form his second government with the six parties
as he was directed to do by Umberto.

Badoglio was in trouble from the

beginning. The Central CLN (CCLN) still chafed at working under a
Prime Minister who had openly functioned under the command of Mussolini.
More importantly, and particularly on the part of the Socialists and the
Actionists, the CCLN viewed itself as the ultimate constitutional authority.

Thus, it exerted pressure to be recognized as such thereby

reducing the Lieutenant General to nothing more than a "figurehead."

68

Marshal Badoglio in the end bowed to CCLN pressure; he informed the
Lieutenant he would not form a new government.

Umberto was compelled

to offer the Badoglio post to the man supported by the CCLN; on June 9
Ivanoe Bonomi, the seasoned Labor Democrat, formed a new government.
There were two governments under the leadership of Bonomi, and the
Conununists served in both of them.

The conflicts between the political

parties of the CCLN which transpired during the duration of these two
governments serves to further illustrate the pattern of behavior exhibited
by the PCI and outlined above in the description of its conduct during
the Badoglio cabinet.

The actions of the Communists under Bonomi

demonstrate first a firm decision to remain in the government, even
at the cost of flexibility and compromise concerning men and issues.
Second, their actions testify to a keen interest in broadening their
base of power from within the government coupled with an incisive
68Mammarella, p. 72.
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awareness as to how to maneuver their position in order to accomplish
this aim.

Evidence to support the above description of the PCI can

be shown through analysis of the two major points of dissension which
plagued the Bonomi ministry.

The first dealt with the purpose of the

CLNs themselves, both on a local level and at the cabinet level.
The second concerned the political purge of ex-Fascists from all areas
of public life.
As was demonstrated above, the Central CLN had become powerful
enough to oblige the Lieutenant General to choose their candidate for
Prime Minister when they no longer wanted Marshal Badoglio.

The CLN

at the local level had also achieved a considerable amount of power.
In liberated Italy they operated in most of the towns and villages, and
because they were the only political forces available, besides the
Fascist ones previously existing there, they were the ones given administrative powers upon liberation at the hands of the Allies.

The

AMG, as a matter of fact, because they were not familiar with the local
situations, tended to depend upon local CLN government.

For the above
69
reasons, the local CLNs "became the arbiters of local life."
There was disagreement among the political parties of the Central
CLN as to how much power these local CLNs should in fact exercise.

The

Liberals and other conservative elements, because they were interested
in preserving the pre-Fascist status quo, obviously wanted to curb the
authority of the local CLNs.

It was in their mind that when the Italian

government regained control over the liberated portions of their
country, the normal channels of administration would be resumed at the

69 Mammarella, p. 75.
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expense of the local CLNs.

These normal channels--prefetti, police

chiefs, local bureaucrats--were the pre-Fascist traditional channels
they so much pref erred.

70

The rightist parties were patently interested

in continuing their influence and in running their country, after
the war ended, in a way which would be beneficial to them.

The leftist

parties, on the other hand, the most vociferous of which were the
Socialists and the Actionists, desired to strengthen the local CLNs for
the purpose of weeding out traditional elements; their aim was to utilize
the CLNs as a base from which to facilitate the social and economic
changes they foresaw for postwar Italy.

The Communists, though they

supported the Socialists and Actionists on a theoretical plane, would
in the end be willing to lose ground on the local CLN issue through
their direct compromise on the purge issue.

This will be demonstrated

shortly; first, one other observation needs to be asserted.
The conflict over the role of the local CLNs was related directly
to the purge of Fascists from the administration of government.

None of

the anti-Fascist parties disagreed with the premise that Italian political
life must be purged of those who had collaborated with Fascism.

It seemed

reasonable, on a moral basis, to punish those who by compromising with
Fascism had gained at the expense of the Italian people.
agreement ended, however, for the political parties.

This is where

Those on the

right were interested in prosecuting members of the "Fascist hierarchy and
Fascist profiteers."
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They did not want the purge to extend beyond the

70 The pref etto ia a goverU1llental official of high rank who speaks
for the government in the province. He has ultimate authority in the
province, even exercising this power aver the locally elected officials.
7

~arella, p. 77.
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leaders because a purge of such magnitude would encompass those classes
of people which would form the bulwark of their political support
once elections were again legal in Italy.

The Liberals and the

Christian Democrats both needed the support of the former ruling
class in order to establish a viable political base.

72

The leftist

parties, on the other hand, and this included the PCI, viewed the purge
as political in function.
In order to build a new democratic society it was first
necessary to eliminate the old political class, which stood for
values contrary to democracy and whose political approach
was strongly tied to Fascist mental habits and methods.73
To get rid of the leaders of Fascism, then, was not the sole aim of the
leftist groups.

Their plan adamantly demanded that broad segments of the

governmental bureaucracy, the army, and the economy be cleansed of any
and all individuals who had fraternized with Fascism either overtly or
merely by a sympathetic attitude.
Regardless of the position taken by the leftists concerning the
Fascist purges, the PCI, when it came down to choosing sides, opted to
compromise--and to compromise substantially--on the purge issue.

Their

actions pinpoint another indication "that the ruling passion of the new
type of communism was government office. 1174

Added to this, through their

compromise, they gained ground politically testifying to their constant
awareness for astute maneuvering within the government.
The argument over the role of the local CLNs and the purge
continued for months, producing many tense moments in the first Bonomi
72
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For the rightists matters had been made more intense by the

cabinet.

appointment of a Communist, Mauro Scoccimaroo, to be the "High Commis75
sioner for Epuration."
They accused Scoccimarro of purging too many
officials.

When, late in November of 1944, he sought the expurgation

of particular finance and maritime officials, pa&sions erupted.

The

Navy Minister Admiral DeCourten and the Treasury Minister Soleri (PLI)
immediately resigned.

Bonomi backed them solidly and went so far as to

demand the dissolution of the office of High Commissioner for Epuration.
Feelings were sq acute that Bonomi resigned as Premier.

77

Bonomi's resignation of itself caused another crisis.

When he

resigned he offered his resignation to Umberto the Lieutenant General,
thus publicly acknowledging him as the executor of constitutional
authority.

This was a stinging affront to the leftists, particularly

to the Socialists who detested the monarchy and who were committed to
constitutional authority residing in the CLN.

"Bonomi patently

was dissociating himself from any conception of a new political order
based on supremacy of the CLN over the old state apparatus."
all this trauma, a new Premier had to be chosen.

78

With

Consultations for

a new government begcµi on the 26th of November, 1944 and continued for
about fifteen days.
75
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With the blocking by the British of Count Sforza

Hilton-Young, p. 172.
Delzell, p. 399.

77 rw.o other reasons which contributed to the downfall of Bonomi
were the British attitude towarda Count Sforza and the problem of the
relationship between the Rome government and the local CLNs. Regarding
the first, the British had blocked Count Sforza from becoming Foreign
Minister in the first Bonomi cabinet. Regarding the second, the local
CLNs resented the appointment by the Rome CLN of thei r local officials.
78
Delzell, p. 460.
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for Prime Minister, the three rightist parties finally agreed to support
79
"England's man" Ivanoe Bonomi as the person to form a new cabinet.
The Socialists and the Actionists adamantly declined to join the
government in opposition to Bonomi.

Nenni had, at the onset of the

crisis produced a manifesto stating that the Socialists would not truck
with a reactionary monarchist such as Bonomi if he ever formed a second
government.

The PSIUP held fi.rm to its expression in the manifesto.

This refusal .on the part of the Socialists surprised few, if any.

When

Togliatti's Communists announced their intention to join the Bonomi
cahinet, however, tfie atmosphere 111ust have oeen reminiscent of his
April svolte during the Badoglio government.

"The Communists, as always,

proved to be more accommodating and although they maintained their
reservations with regard to Ronomi, they agreed to cooperate with him."

80

For Bonomi's second government the Communists appeared to be model
partners.

"The communists continued to show themselves pliant in practice

although rigid in theory .•• Signor Togliatti followed his declared policy
of collaboration with the Regent and the forces of reaction'for the moment'
81
-'per adesso.'"
For the Communists themselves, the second Bonomi government
mirrored both failure to advance changes which they had advocated and

79
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Delzell, p. 461.
Kogan in Italy and the Allies maintains that one possible reason

for this action on the part o! the. fCl was the desire on the part of the
Sovieta. to keep in powex in Ualy "~ak, ineffective,. and unprogressive
groups to improve the praS:l?ectfl. o~ a late:r successful Communist seizure
of pow:e:r." CNorxnan Kogan, !:taly- a.nd tlie Allies (<',;a,noridge, 19'56 J, p. 183.
81ttilton-Young, p. 176.
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in gaining positions in the government which were useful in strengthening
their influence nationally.

On the negative side, though the power of

the national CLN had been upheld, the functions of the local CLN "were
sharply limited, to merely consultative functions."

82

Along with this,

the extent to which the political purge would be carried out was cut
drastically; the High Commission in charge of the purge operation,
which

ha~

been a committee of the CCLN, was abolished, and the orders

for purge were transferred to jurisdiction of the judicial courts.
1be courts invariably moved more slowly and with more leniency than
had Scoccimarro and his coIIDnittee.
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On the positive side, · the

Communists gained influence in the Bonomi cabinet.
Deputy Prime Minister.

Togliatti became a

Antonio Pesenti served as Minister of Finance,

and Mauro Scoccimarro gained the post of Minister for the Occupied
Territories.

The position captured by Scoccimarro turned out to be an

important one for the Communists.

It provided for them a vantage

point within the resistance movement.

1bus, an examination of the

Bonomi governments does indeed show, the PCI, chiefly through its
willingness to be flexible and to come to compromise, in a position of
give and take.

They gave on a couple of issues they had advocated, more

power for the local CLN and a continuance of the purge at high levels;
yet, unlike the Socialists, they were the ones who were in the government,
and by being so they gained of fices and thereby had a base from which
to exert their influence.
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VI. ISSUES: THE PARRI MINISTRY
19 June, 1945-24 November, 1945
Ferruccio Parri came into office on the shirtails of the vento del
nord, the ''wind from the north."

The vento represented the spirit of

the heroic resistance efforts in the North which many hoped would provide
the catalyst for social and economic change in the Italian state now
that the war was over and the business of rebuilding could be resumed
wholeheartedly.

Parri had been the supreme chief of the partisan forces;

he was popular and as such his choice as leader of the government was
received wholeheartedly by those who had been a part of or who identified
with the Resistance.

This enthusiasm was in no way matched by the CCLN

which had actually selected Parri.

At the time he was being considered

for office, forces had been solidifying within governmental parties for
some time and now that the war had ended crystallization of ideas was
imminent.

Within the CCLN the Christian Democrats on the one side and

the Communists and the Socialists on the other side were already
squaring off against one another.

This had gone to the point that neither

of these major parties was willing to give on an issue which might enhance
the political strength of the other party.

Thus, the DC blocked the

possibility for a Nenni Prime Minstership, giving as their ostensible
reason the idea that a Socialist leader would not be looked upon kindly
by the Allies.

Likewise the Socialists obstructed the way for a De Gasperi

Prime Ministership for reasons of the same genre.

84

Ferruccio Parri was

the man the parties were finally able to agree upon.
As an individual Parri's rating is high.

"He was a man of great

organizing ability, absolute rectitude and freedom from spite, and of a
84
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positively eccentric modesty--even humility. 1185

He thrust himself into

his job, working very long hours and sometimes sleeping in his office.

86

Granted this on the positive side, Parri had never before served in
goverrunent; he therefore was lacking in important experience.

Also,

while in prison in Switzerland early in 1945, he had gone on record as
one who eschewed the actual play of politics.
If he could, he said, he would prevent the Party from taking
part in ordinary politica and from holding office and would
encourage it to give its best men to the civil service and to
the non-political organs of reconstruction which, it was to be
expected, would be doing the §'tailed and useful work of
administration after the war.
Whatever positive or negative attributes can be dredged up in an effort
to evaluate Parri in a role he had been cast in, he did face Herculean
88
problems which demanded immediate attention.
Whether his failure in
office--he was forced to resign a mere five months after he resumed his
duties--was attributed mainly to his own inherent shortcomings or
chiefly to the unwillingness of the political parties to come to terms
with each other, and thereby come to terms with the issues facing them,
is perhaps, a moot question.

Nevertheless, one factor is true, and for

purposes here, is important.

The PCI, indirectly or behind the scenes,
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These Herculean probelms consisted of "fighting the inflation
and black market which were reducing millions to destitution; compromising
the Augean problem of epurazione; healing sectional wounds; handling
noisy Sicilian separatists; defining the borders against Yugoslav and
French pretensions; preparing for elections that would shape the
political institutions of the new Italy; and satisfying some of the
demands for land reform." (Delzell, p. 563.)
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worked to the disadvantage of the Action Party and Signor Parri.

They,

more than any other group, were consciously responsible for his
inability to succeed in what he set out to do.
Ferruccio Parri fashioned his government around two goals.

First,

the nation would continue the fight against Fascism not merely on a
legal basis, but also on a moral basis.

Second, social and economic

change must have as its foundation nothing less than complete structural
reform of Italian society. 89
situation.

The first goal met with a complicated

With the liberation of northern Italy and the end of the war,

Italian society faced a mass readjustment to a normal society problem.
The social and economic landscape was glutted with war veterans, resistance fighters, and ex-prisoners of war; with the country already in
a state of physical and financial ruin, there was little hope that these
people could restructure a decent life in the innnediate future.

To this

situation of increasing discontent--unemployment was rampant--was
added the availability of weapons left over from the war and the
resistance movement.

As a result the potential for violence was

established, and many political demonstrations ended in violence.
The reaction of Parri to this state of affairs was in line with his
goal of fighting Fascism on a moral basis.

He was the leader of a

·democratic state which was totally anti-Fascist in his view.

As the

head of such a state, he could never react with "police repression"
to the demonstrations of those people who had put their lives on the
line to rid their country of the odious Fascists.

"He was committed

to realize in the political life of the country the values that had
89
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been established by the resistance movement."

90

Morally, he could

not send the police and the Carabinieri to fire upon the people for
exactly the same anti-Fascist values he and the government (supposedly)
were conunitted to.
The political ramifications of this atmosphere--both the action on
the part of the masses and the reaction on the part of Parri--are
extremely important.
The absence of adequate public powers was deplored by the
propertied and the privileged and soon the 'strong state' was
regretted and the use of energetic means of repression to bring
about order advocated. After a period of disorientation the
forces that traditionally had controlled the economic power
began to react to what appeared to them as an emergency situation,
attempting to retake the initiative lost to the popular classes.
In this case the industrial haute bourgeoisie, who desired a
rapid reconstruction of industry in order to defend its
privileged position, allied its interests with those of the
petit and middle bourgeoisie, ... Such a state of affairs bred a
reactionary spirit with its traditional class hatred.91
The political representatives of the forces discussed above reacted
in kind towards Parri.

Because he would not deal concretely with the

demonstrations, they accused him of being weak and partial to those
responsible.

Even more than just accusations and criticisms within

the cabinet, the Christian Democrats and the Liberals openly and publicly
harangued Parri's actions through the information media over which they
had control.

These circumstances succeeded in establishing an "atmosphere

of hostility" that crippled the Parri government.

92

One last reference

to the problems which confronted Parri's efforts to carry out his first
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goal of dealing with the vestiges of Fascism on a moral basis should be
mentioned.

This concerns the purges which had also plagued the Bonomi

governments.
The middle classes were opposed to extensive purge, and extensive
to them meant any purge at any level that involved them.

Parri's

intent was to broaden the purge operation which had been reduced as a
result of the arguments endemic to the Bonomi governments.

The Actionists,

the Socialists, and the Communists not only supported this move, they
demanded it.

Indeed, Palmiro Togliatti had been given the portfolio

of Justice, and he was ready and willing to act.

It is almost anti-

climactic to assert the position of the middle classes on this issue.
They were intensely against increasing the purge operation; their ranks
.
93
had the most to lose from such a program.
The realization of the second goal sought by Parri fared little
better than did that for the first, and for quite similar reasons.

In

his effort to achieve structural reform of the society, Parri was intent
on checking the power exercised by oligopolies.

He hoped to reorganize

industry along more just lines than it had been organized in the past;
in his scheme the smaller and medium-sized corporations would have more
and better opportunities aimed at achieving a sense of balance in the
industrial sphere.

The specific plan by which Parri meant to bring his

shake-up about was two pronged:

first, it provided for a new income

tax which was designed to strike out at the major industrial alliances
which had reaped large profits while playing the game during the Fascist
regime.

Second, the plan created a system of distribution of the then

very scarce, much needed raw materials which overtly favored small and
93
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medium-sized businesses over the large ones.

As in his efforts to

accomplish his first goal, Parri was met with staunch resistance from
the right.

The Liberals reacted openly in criticism for the same reasons

they had criticised the other ideas of Parri.

They were conunitted to

maintaining the traditional power structure of Italian society which had
been fact since the Risorgimento, and they knew that Parri's political
direction was the tool for the destruction of their power base.

In their

attacks against Parri, the Liberals gained a wide range of support from
different public elements, not because they stood to lose in the same
way, but because they viewed the second goal of the Parri plan as a means
of attacking private property. 94
The really long-range political ramifications which resulted from
the conflict in the Parri government, however, was the sharp line being
etched between left and right.

Because the leftist parties openly supported

Parri's program, Parri, who aimed at restructuring society socially and
economically with parity as the foundations, was "accused of complicity
with the Communists and of favoring their plans for gaining control of the
95
economic life of the country."
Fuel was added to leftist versus
rightist fire by the continually inflamatory institutional question.
Parri and the republicans wanted to arrange national elections as soon
as possible; they felt that the time was favorable for a republican win,
and they wished to exploit this situation.

The monarchists--the Liberals

and certain Christian Democratic elements--on the other hand wished to
delay the elections.

They, of course, felt that they had everything

to gain by waiting for a more strategic electoral opportunity.
94 Mammarella, p. 101.
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The "ill-starred government" of Parri was doomed to early failure.
Crisis-ridden, it was taut with tension.
the Liberals precipitated a
to resignation.

~risis

Finally, in November, 1945,

which, added to the

others~

The subject this time concerned the purge.

drove Parri

As was

pointed out earlier, Togliatti had been appointed Minister of Justice
in the Parri cabinet.

A common practice of

11

defascistization" under hi s

administration was imprisonment without tria1.

96

The Liberals chose to

make an issue of this, and in November they demanded that this arbitrary
action be curbed and required further that to accomplish this Parri
should draft into his cabinet some older statesman who had no ties with
the CLN and who opposed the purge to the extent it was currently being
enacted.

When Parri refused to take action on their demands, the Liberal

ministers resigned.

"Though De Gasperi piously called for continuation

of the CLN hexarchy, he knew well that the PLI would not change its mind.
Soon he associated the DC with the PLI boycotters of Parri. 1197

With th e

Christian Democrats' support of the Liberals and their resignation,
Parri could no longer hope to survive.

On November 24, 1945 he resigne d.

The fact that the actions of the Liberals and the Christian
Democrats caused the fall of Parri is without contention, but it is
misleading to end with blame only directed toward them.
of the piece have not been identified in total.

The villains

Norman Kogan maintains

that "The Communists helped the Christian Democrats undermine the Parri
governmen t , the only one in postwar Italy really serious about social
progress. 1198

This is probably true, as astonishing as it may be (for

96 Hi lton-Young, p. 183.
97 De lzell, p. 566.
98Kogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 184.
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there is inherent contradiction without Mr. Kogan's thought).

It is

correct, for instance, that throughout the crises that occurred during
the Parri five month government, the leftists, including the Communists,
openly supported Parri's plan for change in postwar Italian society.
To demonstrate their antipathy towards the slowness with -which the
purge was being carried out, the Communists organized and led a series of
riots.

When Parri's fall was imminent, they activated the people into

demonstrations against his loss.

Nonetheless, the fact cannot be

overlooked that although the PCI supported Parri and his Actionists
on the surface of things, they did not support him vigorously.

The real

intent of Togliatti and the PCI was once again, as in the previous
governments, to retain at all costs the positions in the government that
they had thus far gained.
Togliatti and the PCI were very much aware of what they were
doing and what consequences would probably be precipitated by their
actions.

Togliatti's motivation during the Parri government was

engineered in one direction:

treading softly in an effort to gain poli-

tical footholds wherever he was able.

With concern chiefly for the sur-

vivability of the PCI in government--letting by-product consequences
fall as they might--he accomplished his goal in several ways.

First,

because he believed that an open revolution was not possible in Italy
at that time--there were Anglo-American troops and no Red Army--he did
not indulge in leftist, fiery impassioned speeches; instead behind the
scences he aimed at suppressing the fears of the conservative elements.
Second, he utilized his energies to create a powerful workers' party by
gaining and forging a strong position within the CGIL, the Italian

99

Delzell, p. 563.
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General Confederation of Labor, and organization which represented the
resurrection of labor unions along pre-Fascist lines, and whose leadership
was composed of the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, and the Communists.
Third, and most significant politically, Togliatti maneuvered to maintain, and thereby succeeded, a working relationship with Nenni and the
PSIUP.

The Unity of Action Pact first arrived at in 1934 as part of

the Popular Front was renewed.

Though this would result in the future

subordination of the Socialist Party to the Communist Party, it was
certainly short of fusion of the two parties, something which had come
close to happening except for the efforts of Saragat and Silone, both
moderates in the Socialist Party.

The important point to be noted is

that the renewal of the Unity of Action Pact signaled the demise of the
Action Party.

The Actionists and the revisionist element of the

Socialist Party had envisioned a coalition between them.
coalition.

The renewal of

With the Togliatti-Nenni Alliance, there was no "enduring

place 11 for the PdA; they had always been a very small party of intellectuals with little popular support, and now they had no place to go.
History was repeating itself: just as Carlo Rosselli's
Giustizia e Libert~ had been overtaken by the Social-Communist
bloc in the era of the Popular Front and Spanish Civil War,
[See Chapter II, The Communist Party in Italy 1921-1941] so
Parri's Action Party was being outmaneuvered by Togliatti's
brilliant tactics, the realities of Anglo-American power, and
the mistakes of its won hotspurs.100
In shedding even more light on this issue of the decline of the
Action Party, one might consider the idea, put forth by Mammarella for
one, that worked towards the downfall of Parri because it feared both
him and the Action Party.

This fear rested on the supposition that if

his plan for change had been successful then the PdA might have become
100 Delzell, pp. 564-565.
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the moving force for the masses instead of the PCI.

The Action Party,

for the Communists, represented a "potentially dangerous competitor" who
might be able to gain the allegiance of the people because of Parri's
glorious leadership in the Resistance and because of his dauntless
unwillingness to compromise.
In the last analysis, the PCI was acutely aware of which way the
political wind was blowing.

They recognized the discontent in the conser-

vative upper and middle classes which had been generated by the ideas
fostered in the Parri government.

They knew that this discontent was

the reason why the Christian Democrats had chosen to cease their support
of Parri, and they reasoned that the swing back--towards the traditional
vested interests--was going to continue for the foreseeable future.
There was a progressive return to the old mental habits
which were not openly Fascist any longer but paternalistic
and authoritarian. Democracy was realized in the structures
and the institutions but not in spirit; the fundamental freedoms
were formally guaranteed but their meaning was partially negated
by the favoring of vested interests.101
With this awareness present, Togli&tti, "one of the shrewdest politicians
of the century," chose to "blow" as harmoniously as possible with the
wind.

The PCI's survivability as a viable member of the government

depended on this move.

lOlMammarella, p. 103.

CHAPTER V
THE PCI AND THE RESISTANCE SEPTEMBER, 1943-MAY, 1945:
A TIME FOR AGGRESSION
I. THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT
September 8, 1943, marked the birth of the Resistenza Armata
in the half of Italy under the German heel. The void left in
Rome and the North by the fugitive royal-military government
and the disintegrating Italian armies in the face of ruthless
German attack, followed by the shocking news of Mussolini's
rescue, helped induce thousands of Italian patriots to join the
partisan movement. This struggle, undertaken against heavy
odds, climaxed two decades of clandestine opposition to Fascism
and in no small degree helped to redeem Italy's all-butshattered moral and military reputation.l
During the period when the Italian Peninsula was divided in two, the
people who lived in the South and the people who inhabited the North
and Central portions lived two quite different experiences.

In the

South, the Italians had been liberated from the Fascists and the Germans;
in practice they were free and could go about their business.

Technically,

they were subjects of the Allies and as such were "scorned, misunderstood,
and suffering from every kind of shortage and privation... .. 2

Th e war

was over for the southerners; yet, the period of almost two years
which followed the landing of the Anglo-American troops was one in which
they felt little self-esteem and certainly not much a part of their
1 charles F. Delzell, Mussolini's Enemies
Fascist Resistance (Princeton, 1961), p. 261.
2

p. 137.

The Italian Anti-

H. Stuart Hughes, The United States and Italy (Cambridge, 1953),
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destinies.

For those Italians who lived on the other side of the

battle lines, particularly in the North, the post armistice period was
quite another experience.

In their arena, whether they chose it or

not, a war was raging, and it was a war not only against an invader
but also against fellow Italians.
Though it is probably accurate that a good many of the people
were passive and apathetic, nonetheless a large number of per sons,
"a considerable minority which consciously and positively refused to
accept Mussolini's doctrines," 3 worked actively towards liberating themselves from their oppressors.

As was true of movements elsewhere in

Europe, the Resistance movement in Italy was comprised of many different
elements.

There were workers and industrialists who lowered their

rate of production in an effort to hurt German war production.

Many public

officials refused to obey German orders and secretly gave aid to antiGerman fighters.
Germans.

Some simply went into hiding rather than work for the

Peasants were yet another element who aided in the Resistance;

many would not supply farm products to the enemy, and whenever they
were able they hid prisoners of war or partisans.

Finally there were

the armed guerrillas and saboteurs themselves who formed the backbone of
the Resistance. 4

These elements of the population at one time or another

gave help, each in its own specific way, towards driving the enemy
out of Italy.
3Massimo Salvadori-Paleotti, "The Patriot Movement in Italy,"
Foreign Affairs, April, 1946, p. 539.
4

Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 539.
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The Italian Resistance was composed of two major elements.
.

was political and the other military.

5

One

The former was comprised of

local Committees of National Liberation (CLNs).

These CLNs were

clandestine counterparts to the Central CLN in Rome which had evolved
from Ivanoe Bonomi's Anti-Fascist Committee formed on 9 September, 1943.

6

During the latter part of 1943 and in 1944, northern and central area
CLNs were formed in every regional capital, in most of the provincial
capitals, and in many of the towns and villages. 7

Usually they were,

like the Central CLN, composed of representatives from the major political
parties. 8

Milan's underground organization met soon after the armistice

was announced on September 8, and at this meeting it decided to follow
in the footsteps of the CCLN by transforming itself into a CLN.

Because

of its competent leadership and its strategic location, the Milan CLN
developed into the most important Committee for the North.

9

In fact

it later created the CLN dell'Alta Italia (CLNAI) which communicated
5Muriel Grindrod, The New Italy
(London, 1947), p. 16.
6

Transition From War to Peace

7

See Chapter IV, "The PCI and Politics," the section on the

CLNs.

salvadori-Paleotti, p. 541.

8

See Chapter IV, "The PCI and Politics," keeping in mind that in
the South the CLNs had representatives from six political parties while
in the North they were comprised of representatives from five major
parties. The Labor Democrats were not represented in the Northern CLNs.
Also Salvadore-Paleotti indicates that "sometimes only three or
four of the major anti-Fascist parties were represented [in the North];
sometimes the committees included smaller organizations which had
local political significance, such as Italian Republicans, Social
Christians and Anarcho-Syndicalis ts." (Salvadore-Paleotti, p. 541.)
9

Delzell, p. 278.
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with Allied Force Headquarters and for all practical purposes controlled
both the political and military Resistance in the North.lo The CLNAI
"had more or less parallel status with the Rome CCLN." 11 In the city of
Turin the Comitato Piemontese di Liberazione Nazionale (CPLN) evolved
from the Committee of the Opposition, the underground organization which
had existed there from early 1943.

Like its sister CLNs in the North,

the Torinese group functioned in virtual secrecy.

Its members were very

careful about outsiders, and they moved their meeting places continuously.
Gatherings out of doors preferably were restricted to two or
three persons and were confined usually to outlying streets.
While walking, the conspirators might exchange a few important
documents, though a basic rule was to keep written material at
a minimum and in code whenever feasible.12
In Florence the Comitato Toscano di Liberazione Nazionale (CTLN) also
was born from an earlier underground organ.

In 1943. and 1944, then,

all over the North, in Genoa, Bologna, Padua, Trent, and Trieste, in the
wake of Milan and Turin and Florence, more Comitati were "mushrooming".
The CLNs were extremely imporant to the total Resistance movement.
They were the lifeline of the military segment; everywhere they were
organized as "centers for communication, supply, and political propaganda."
10

Grindrod, The New Italy, p. 16.

11
12
13

Delzell, p. 278.
Delzell, p. 279.

Hughes, p. 139. Elizabeth Wiskemann also adds, as another major
task of the CLNs in the cities, the sabotage of industrial production.
Both industrialists and workmen were willing to carry this out. Enrico
Falck of the Falck steel works in Milan worked with his own men to
decrease production to the minimum. Factory workers in Milan and Turin
"excelled in short sit-down strikes on some plausible economic pretext."
And of course there were the big strikes of 1943 and 1944. (Elizabeth
Wiskemann, "The Italian Resistance Movements," Survey of International
Affairs, 1939-1946, ed. Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee, Vol.: Hitler's
Europe (London, 1954), p. 329.

13
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The Resistance fighters, those actually in the field carrying on
guerrilla warfare and sabotage against the Germans and the Fascists,
soon realized how important their function was.

The number of men who

could be fed and clothed and maintained in any valley was limited.
"The peasants were usually willing to share what food they had, but
not to the point of starving themselves."

14

In order to meet the extreme

need for food and arms and money, the leaders of Resistance groups
which were living in the mountains appealed to and relied upon the CLNs
in the local towns and villages to supply their requirements.

"Thus they

were brought to accept, at least partly, the authority of the underground centralized organizations. 1115
The second major division of the Resistance was the military
branch.

This was the armed segment of the movement, and its members

were called partisans or patriots.

Though in recent years Italy had

had really no established precedent for revolutionary or guerrilla
warfare, there were and had been forces existent within the peninsula
which accounted for the rise of the militancy exhibited during the
twenty months of German-Fascist occupation.

First, many Italians

with leftist political affiliations, from the PCI, the PSIUP, and the
PdA, had gained first hand experience in guerrilla tactics during the
Spanish Civil War.

16

These same men and others knew of and followed the

movements of the Resistance in France, Yugoslavia and eastern Europe.

14 Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 542.
15

Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 542.

16 see Chapter II, "The Communist Party in Italy," the section
concerning the Togliatti leadership from abroad.
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With this background the leaders in the Italian movement began to set
the stage for the fighting in the occupied areas.

Togliatti, even

before returning to Italy in March, 1944, had broadcast from Moscow to
his fellow Italians that they must be strong in the forthcoming underground
fight.

The Communists of Rome and the Actionists of Florence had both

"anticipated the task" of preparing for the armed underground struggle,
and both had set "precise military plans" into motion well before the
actual fighting had begun. 17

A second reason, and one worth mentioning,

which possibly accounts for the rapid rise of the partisan movement in
northern Italy is the fact that in Italy which was the poorest country
in Europe with the lowest standard of living for the masses of people,
industry was located mainly in the North, "and in the northern cities
were the most active democratic movement and the strongest trade unionism
before the advent of Fascism. 1118

The heritage of Socialism and Communism

cannot be overlooked when considering the strikes and the sabotage to
industrial production which took place in northern cities as part of the
Resistenza Armata.
The greatest number of partisans lived and fought from the
mountains, either those that bordered the Po valley or the Apennines
located in central Italy. 19
17

The reasons for their mountainous existence

Delzell, p. 286.

18Lord Strabolgi, The Conquest of Italy (London, 1944), p. 65.
19

Delzell, p. 285. The partisans who operated from towns were
not as numerous as those existing in the mountains and hills~ They
were, however, in the beginning better organized and "had a more
definite political character." (Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 540.)
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deal, of course, with tactics.

They had to be in range of the enemy,

and concomitantly able to reach land which was either forested or
mountainous so that they could hide from him.

Also, as was hinted at

above, partisans tended to gather in locations where they could quickly
add to their numbers, that is near towns and cities.

Added to these

considerations, they had to be ever concerned about refurbishing their
food and clothing supply and their arms supply; consequently, "logistics
restricted their range of operations to zones where supplies might readily
be acquired. 1120

Thus, they could not be too far from towns as well as

from farm areas because they needed to eat, and warmth during the winter
was essential.

They had to be prepared to make strategic raids on supply

depots or outposts in order to ensure possession of enough weaponry to
continue fighting.
The basic unit in the partisan organization was a detachment which
contained about fifty men.
three or four squads.

This detachment was further divided into

Detachments of fifty men comprised a battalion,

and three battalions formed a brigade, with an average concentration of
about 450 men.

In actuality, the numbers in a brigade were anywhere

from 250 to 600 men.

Finally, three brigades equalled a division.

In

each detachment battalion, brigade and division the chief leaders were
the commander and the political connnissar.

21

As. the Resistance movement was compose~ of two major divisions,

the political and the military, so the military division was further
broken down into yet two other chief branches.

There were many men

who had served in the Italian Army who chose to join partisan bands.
20
21

Delzell, p. 285.
Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 542.
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These men who came from disbanded army groupings came to be known as
P,.utonomi because they formed "autonomous" patriot groups which claimed
to be without political bias towards any of the political parties,
including those major ones represented in the CLNs. 22

They eschewed

any and all political questions, making it clear that such questions
should be settled only when the struggle at hand was ended.

23

The second major branch of the military Resistance was formed
by the political partisan bands.

These bands differed from the Auto-

nomi in that they did not eschew political allegiance; in fact, they were
closely connected to political parties, their leadership usually drawn
24
from party activists.
The political partisans were more numerous than
the Autonomi, and the three Leftist parties formed more

ba~ds

than did

the other political parties.
A careful Allied liaison officer and investigator has estimated
that in the North (including upper Tuscany) political bands
accounted for three fourth of the guerrillas, and in central
Italy about two-thirds.25
The PCI had the best organized and the greatest number of partisan
bands.

These bands were called the Garibaldini, and they made up from

fifty to fifty-five per cent of the whole partisan army.

26

They were

22

They were also called "badogliani", a derisive term describing
them as persons who had collaborated with Marshal Badoglio in the period
of the "forty-five days."
23

Delzell, p. 287.

24 Giuseppe Mammarella, Italy After Fascism
1943- 1965 (Notre Dame, 1966), p. 81.
25
26

De lzell, p. 290.
Mammarella, p. 81.
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most efficiently organized, and though by far not all the members of
their ranks were Communists, it was an absolute must that the leadership
in the groups always be from the Communist cadres.

27

The second most numerous units after those controlled by the
Communists were the forces under the leadership of the Action Party.
Their bands known as the Giustizia e Liberta and the Rosselli brigades
probably made up about one fourth the entire number of political bands.

28

The Actionist leadership had a deep sense of commitment and provided
considerable competition to the Communists in terms of this commitment,
and also in the publication of and spreading of propaganda.

29

Though on a smaller basis, other political parties also formed
groups of partisans to fight in the Armed Resistance.

The Christian

Democrats and the Liberals, preferring to lend their support to Autonomi
who already existed, entered into the scene relatively late. Only in
1944, and again in 1945, did the Christian Democrats initiate their own
partisan groups; the Liberals did likewise.

The Socialists eventually

created the Matteotti brigades which operated mainly in the uplands of
Lombard and Piedmont.

Finally, there were a few local, small parties

which sporadically created fighting groups in sundry locations or
joined with one or another of those groups sponsored by the main
.
30
parties.
27

28

Delzell, p. 290.
Delzell, p. 292.

29
30

Delzell, p. 292.
Delzell, pp. 294-295.
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During the first winter of the Resistance, 1943-1944, the two
major groupings of the Armed Resistance, the members of tbe political
bands and the Autonomi or Badogliani as they were called, were, in a
sense, at odds with each other.

At this point in time the CLNs had

not yet joined the Badoglio government, and this caused much internal
tension.

After April, 1944 when a new cabinet had been formed by Badoglio

which did include representatives from the major political parties,
tension was decreased among the partisans. 31

This is important because

the acceptance of Marshal Badoglio as Prime Minister by the Central
CLN "laid the foundations for cooperation among the various elements of
the Patriot movement. 1132
The Italian Resistance movement, then, was a national movement
and a popular uprising.

It was national in character because it was

nourished by an anti-German sentiment the roots of which reached back
to the Risorgimento and the First World War.

It was a popular movement

in that individuals from all social strata became at one time or another
involved in it.

The Church, the army, the middle classes, the upper

classes, the working classes in the cities, and the peasants in the
countryside all contributed in their own fashion to the success of
33
struggle against the Germans and the Fascists.
The motives which led such various and different types of people
to partake in the same fight are, to say the least, interesting to

31

See Chapter IV, "The PCI and Politics," the section on the
Badoglio governments.
32
33
Italy

Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 542.

shepard B. Clough and Salvatore Saladino, A History of Modern
Documents, Readings, and Counnentary (New York, 1968), p. 526.
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contemplate.

Perhaps the statement that these motives were "a mixture

of patriotic, ideological, idealistic reasons, intertwined with selfinterest" is the most accurate that can be offered.

34

For many of the

ex-Army men who joined the Armed Resistance, cormnitment was based on
feelings of patriotism and idealism.

These men felt a deep sense of

loyalty to the oath they had sworn in allegiance to their King.

In

their minds Victor Emmanuel continued to stand for the Italian state;
in fact, he was the only man who legally had the right to lead the country.
These ex-soldiers, in point of fact, viewed themselves as the legal
representatives of the King and the Italian government; they were
intent upon loyalty to their oath and were prepared to fight to this
end.

35

Certainly ideological reasons for fighting in the Resistance
were also prevalent.

These were found chiefly among the ranks of the

political partisans, as opposed to the Autonomi.

Though the bulk of the

Christian Democrats and the Liberals viewed the Armed Resistance basically
as a means to rid the country of the Germans and the Fascists, the
Leftist parties saw the entire movement as vastly more important than
merely ending the war as swiftly as possible.

Most of them believed

passionately that the underground "also represented the armed force of
a revolutionary movement which was to reshape the political and social
structure of the country at the end of the war. 1136

They trusted in the

idea that the Resistance would be the springboard from which change in
34
35

Delzell, p. 286.
Clough, Saladino, pp. 527-528.

36 Mannnarella, p. 81.
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Italian society would begin.

The old traditional elements so strongly

woven into the society would be rooted out, and the working classes
would refashion the state along lines fair and jus.t for the people.
Also ideologically, there were those who took part in the Resistance
because they thought of Fascism as nothing but Evil personified.

A

certain set of situations and circumstances had allowed this "Evil"
to beset Italian life, but once it was cut out of the body of the
state all would be well.

As Croce had dictated it was like a tumor

that "would never return. 1137
Idealistic motivation was not absent from the ranks of the
Resistance .
..• the historian cannot deny the presence of a substantial
measure of tough-fibered idealism and discipline among the
underground fighters if he is to explain satisfactorily the
readiness of the hard core of volunteers to face up month
after month to the handicaps of that kind of warfare and the
cruel tortures, if not death itself, that almost certainly
became their lot when captured.38
There is considerable evidence to support the existence of this !audible
idealism.

Many of the partisans were captured by the Germans and then

were sentenced to die; "last letters" from many of these men attest to
the fact that they sincerely and passionately believed in what they had
fought for and were, indeed, willing to die for the same cause.

The tone

of these letters reveals "a sense of political vision and of calm, and
mora 1 f ort i tu de ... 1139

No better example of this can be offered than to

quote a line from a letter of Duccio Galimberti (affiliated with the
37
38
39

Clough, Saladino, p. 527.
Delzell, p. 289.
Delzell, p. 289.

86
Action Party) written to his family after he has been condemned to death
as a prisoner of war:

"I acted with good intentions for an ideal:

fo r

this I am serene, and so must you also be. 1140
Finally, there were those who entered the ranks of the Resistance
with self-preservation as their primary motive.

They went into the

Resistance in an effort to escape being recruited by the Germans for
labor in Germany as quasi-prisoners of war or by the Fascists for military
service against their own people.

They reasoned that it was better to

escape from a pressing and sure problem, while hoping that the war
would somehow come to a speedy conclusion.

And, of course, there was

that minority of individuals who figured that sooner or later membership
in the Resistance rank and file would provide "indispensable credentials"
in the future rebuilding of the state. 41

Whatever the motives were for

those who participated in the Resistance, and seemingly they were
varied, the movement itself worked; it had its glory and it was
successful.

Perhaps it is enough to conclude this section concerning

the motivation on the part of those who involved

themselve~

in the

Resistance by repeating the sentiment of Paolo Treves which he expressed
in June, 1944:
Many figures have been put forth about the strength of the
patriots' ranks, and it seems that the most conservative
estimates reckon with 300,000 men. Obviously not every single
man in the patriot formations is a politically minded antiFascist. That cannot be so, but it is, I submit, permissible
to say that the Iecovery of Italy will be very largely the work
of her own sons. 2
40 Delzell, p. 289.
41
42

Clough, Saladino, p. 528.

Paolo Treves, "The Underground in Italy," International Postwar
Problems, June, 1944, p. 421.
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The Armed Resistance took place chiefly in the northern and
central portions of Italy.

No partisans organized themselves in Sicily

or in Sardinia; this was due in part because the Allies landed there first.
but it was also attributed to the dearth of political and social awareness
endemic to the islands' populations.

An identical lack of consciousness

was to be found in most of southern Italy. with the exception of the city
of Naples.

43

In that city in the fall of 1943 there occurred a small

spontaneous rebellion against the Germans which perhaps provided the
one creditable southern contribution to the Armed Resistance.

The

quattro giornate (the four glorious days. as the rebellion came to be
called) happened during the four days between September 27 and 30. 1943.
Shortly after Marshal Badoglio had made public the armistice
between the Allies and his government, the Germans with little resistance
took over the city of Naples.

There was a committee of anti-Fascist

parties active in the city, but they seemed unable to rally the citizens
against the enemy.

Nonetheless as time passed, hostility built up

between the population and the Germans who were anything but kind
overseers. 44

In addition to their problems with the interloper, the

inhabitants of the port city suffered both from food and water shortages
and from continuous Allied aerial bombardments.

Under these potentially

explosive circumstances violence finally materialized.

On the 27th of

September the Germans shot five persons and imprisoned fifty more as a
reprisal for the killing of one of their motorcyclists.

The Italians--

mainly some very young persons from the lower classes--decided to fight
43
44

Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 542.
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back, and their revolt spread rather quickly.

45

Their insurrection

continued for four days, though there was apparently no specific
organization or goal on the part of the rioters.
The quattro giornate was not representative of the partisan
warfare of the Armed Resistance; " .•. it attained neither the degree of
political purpose nor mass support that characterized the struggle in the
North."

46

But though it was not fighting that emulated the caliber of

that executed in the North, it did make a contribution to the Resistance
movement.

Those Neapolitans who took part in the quattro giornate

"unwittingly" showed their fellow countrymen that the Germans (with the
threat of imminent Allied help} could be defeated by the Italians and
their own efforts.

"It is possible that the rioting .•. was one of the

factors which induced the Nazies to abandon the city."

47

The Neapolitan

rebellion, then, provided the Northern partisans with an example worth
imitating.
In central Italy resistance activity, though it was only moderately
extensive, was more clearly evident than in the South.

During the time

period between October, 1943 and June, 1944 when the Allies began their
drive to liberate the remaining part of the peninsula from Rome northward,
the Resistance movement in central Italy took form and as it developed
caused serious problems for the Germans and the Fascist Social Republic.
It has been estimated that there were 8,000 members of the underground
in Rome itself; whether because of conflict or for other reasons, however,
45

Salvadori-Paleotti, p. 542.

46 Delzell, p. 283.
47
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a~ounted

the efforts of this Roman contingenct we re poorly coordinated and

. 1e. 48
to 1itt

There were large groups of partisans located in central

I taly, and they were found chiefly in the main range of the Apennines;
just to the

~ast

of this main range there were also present fairly

large bands of guerrillas, though they were not as concentrated as the
former.

In the sparsely inhabited areas of the Lazio, northern Abruzzi,

and southern Tuscany smaller partisan bands existed.

49

It was in the northern sector of central Italy, in such areas as
Tuscany and Romagna, that the real strength of the central segment of the
Armed Resistance demonstrated itself.

In these areas the partisans were

more numerous, more active, and better prepared.
They operated all along the main range of the Apennines and
also in the secondary mountainous regions: Alpe di Catenaia
and Casentino, southeast and east of Florence; Pratomagno,
Mugello and Monte Pisano a little further north. Some bands,
although very small, led an independent existence. Others were
grouped, making up as many as 2,000 Patriots.SO
Finally, the city of Florence and the partisan effort demonstrated there
provided the Resistance in central Italy with its apogee.
Allies had entered the Tuscan city in August, 1944, the

Before the

part~sans

there

had already liberated an entire quarter; they went on to help the
51
British and the Americans take the remainder of the city.
The best partisan bands of the Armed Resistance, in terms of
organization, discipline, and effectiveness, were in the North.
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It was
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in this area, in the mountains of Piedmont and Lombardy, that armed
guerrillas had first emerged.

Shortly after, other partisans fanned

out over the northern landscape, clandestinely surfacing in Emilia,
Liguria, and the mountains of the Veneto.

Some of the finest northern

Italian partisan groups, mostly Garibaldini, occupied the mountains in
Modena and Reggio.

These groups were well-supplied by the Allies with

arms and ammunition, and they posed an effective threat to the Germans .
Finally, in the Lombard-Emilian Apennines, particularly, there were
partisans west of Piacenza and southwest of Pavia and elsewhere in
Lombardy and at least until September, 1944, many survived in valleys
east of Lake Como.

52

As

far as the citi es and towns of northern Italy

we re concerned, they sheltered fewer partisans than did the mountains.
Turin had probably the largest percentage of Patriots relative
to its population, and they were the best organized. Second came
the industrial area of greater Genoa, with Bologna third. The
Resistance movement in Milan, Venice and Trieste could rely on
a certain number of Patriots, though the number in these cities
was not large considering their size. Patriot groups were
found in some smaller towns, although their activities were
limited.53
.
II. THE ROLE OF THE PCI IN THE RESISTANCE
The Communists who participated in the Resistance were idealistic,
disciplined, and connnitted to what they believed the movement stood for.
Giaime Pintor was a young poet and a member of the Connnunist Party.
His decision to join the ranks of the Armed Resistance epitomizes the
idealism which prompted many of the leftist oriented partisans to leave
their homes and take to the mountains.
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These Resistance soldiers
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looked upon the fight to drive the Germans and the Fascists from Italy
as another Risorgimento.

Pintor's decision, as the decision of others,

was fired by the zealous ideal of lib.erty and justice for all classes
of society; they were no longer willing to accept the status quo of the
rigidly ordered, traditionalist Italian society.

In the words of Pintor:

Today the possibilities of the Risorgimento are reopened for
the Italians: no gesture is useless provided it does not
become an end in itself. As for me, I assure you that the idea
of going to be a partisan in this season gives me very little
pleasure; I have never appreciated as now the comforts of
civilized life and I feel sure that I would become an excellent
translator and a good diplomat, but according to every likelihood a mediocre partisan. Nevertheless, it is the only
possibility open and I accept it.54
The party activists who organized and led the Garibaldini were
highly disciplined in their attitude, as well as idealistic.

They were

obedient and dedicated to the Party; in fact their allegiance was
fervent, almost religious in character.

They established an attitude

in their bands in which all was subordinated to the cause of the
Resistance.

No one expected any privileges.

If anyone were even

offered a plate of spaghetti by a peasant, the food was refused.
were even the "saints, 11 those who suffered quietly and gladly.

1bere
There

was one man who preferred to sleep on the ground rather than in a
bed in order to be "closer to humility;" there was also a man who had
sold his teeth so he could give some money to his family.

55

The tone

set by the party leadership for their partisan bands was one inherently
54
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Delzell, p. 289.

Giorgio Bacca, Storia Dell'Italia Partigiana (Bari, 1966), p. 99.
Bacca ends his paragraph with this statement: "Un grande partito una
grande rivoluzione che ha cambiato la faccia del mondo, ma i bigotti
restano bigotti, il fanatismo fanatismo e la religione puo degradare
a superstizione." His view of the Communists is a sardonic one.
(Bacca, p. 99.)
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disciplined.

These leaders were men who had already proved their

toughness and their commitment to the Party and to the struggle; their
dedication was predicated on having spent time in prison for their belie fs
and/or having fought in the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil
War.
The most important description of the role played by the Conununists
in the Resistance is that dealing with their commitment.

Unlike the

Christian Democrats and the Liberals who viewed participation in the
Resistance only for the purpose of ridding the country of the undesirable
opponents, the PCI considered the participation dual in purpose.

The

first goal for them was the obvious one, and the one they shared with the
non-leftist parties.

The second aim of the PCI was the more long range

of the two; for the Connnunists "the Resistance was not only a national
and patriotic force organized to oust the Germans from the country, but
also represented ••. a movement which was to reshape the political and
social structure of the country .•. 1156

The performance of the Communists

in carrying out their first goal receives a high mark; they were extremely
effective in their organizational abilities and as

l~aders,

not only

in the Garibaldini, but as an example to all the other partisan bands,
Autonomi and political.

In evaluating the success of their second goal,

perhaps the most accurate statement is that their attempt was an astute
one.

This evaluation is important, because though they did not succee d

in bringing about the change that they desired, during the Resistance
period they were continuously aware of the forces working for them and
against them, and they constantly attempted to manipulate these forces
56
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to their advantage.

Because of this awareness and this aggressiveness,

their endeavors, historically, cannot be taken lightly.
The most meaningful experience in the formation of a leadership
cadre in the Italian Communist Party was their long period of
clandestine activity and the Resistance movement they directed
against the Germans.57
The Communists were indeed the leaders and the organizers in the
Resistance.

There is much evidence to support the contention that they

provided a model for other underground groups.

Early in the winter of
.
58
1944 the Communists introduced the concept of the political commissar.
The Garibaldini had one commissar for about every fifty men.
task of this man was to inculcate discipline in his grouping.

The chief
He

achieved this by setting aside a certain number of hours each day, or
almost every day, during which discussions and lectures of a political
nature were held.

An example of the conunissar's discipline system is

reflected in instructions handed down in 1944:
Wherever Communists find themselves--in factories, villages,
offices, partisan formations--they have the duty to organize
themselves and carry on activity. In the absence of this, they
cease for practical purpose to function in the party. There is
weakness and lack of discipline wherever Communists are not
present, and the Communists are an element of force only if they
are organized.59
Further, the commissar was responsible for coordinating PCI work
between his partisan group and the Party.

He had to supervise one

57 sidney Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Haven,
1967), p. 227.
58

The employment of political commissars was not a new idea.
The Communists had used commissars at different times in the Russian
Red Army, the International Brigades of the Spanish Civil War, and the
Balkan partisan movements.
59
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person from his band who would report to the "federal committee" (of
the Party) in each province.

The "federal committee" coordinated the

functioning of all the cells in the partisan bands which existed in its
province.

If cells were non-existent where they should be present,

the commissar was responsible for their immediate formation.

60

The Conununists were most serious about the organizational quality
of their partisan bands, and in introducing the office of the political
commissar they provided the tight discipline and excellent coordination
that was needed.

The salient point is that they saw the need, and they

provided the solution through their leadership.

It was not long before

many of the other partisan groups (political partisans) followed their
lead, though it was "with some reluctance, and perhaps in self-defense,
that certain other formations also adopted the system." 61
in fact, strong rivalries among the political partisans.

There were,
It is important

to note, also, that when other groups did finally copy the commissar idea
of organization within their partisan formations, the evershrewd Communists
did their utmost to place their men in these strategic positions.
Both the Communists and the Actionists shared the spotlight when
it crune to advertising the glorious ideals of the Resistance.

Both

entered the Resistance with backgrounds rich in the experience of publishing in the clandestine press.

They had, unlike the other Italian political

parties, operated in the underground movement against Mussolini almost
from the beginning.

Though many of the partisan groups produced newspapers,

pamphlets, poems, bulletins, and the like, gradually the PCI emerged as
60
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a leader of this movement within a movement.

Early in the Resistance

the PCI, along with the PdA, published more material than any group. 62
They put out regularly an underground paper in Rome and in Milan, and
they also produced periodicals for the partisan bands on a regular basis.
The main purpose for the publications was to maintain the morale of the
Resistance and to make known its ideals.

PC! political theory and infor-

mation was expounded in its La nostra lotta and L'Unita.

63

As the Resistance movement progressed, the Supreme Headquarters of

the Resistance "issued a decree" calling upon all those fighting in the
movement to turn out propaganda literature.

The Supreme Headquarters

of the Resistance was part of the CLNAI, and the CLNAI was dominated
by the leftist parties, particularly the Communist Party.

Thus, this

decree was in effect issued by the PCI; by the middle of September, 1944,
when the edict was given, the Communists had indeed assumed a posture of
leadership concerning the operations of the clandestine press.

The decree

also included further instructions, not surprisingly along the organizational
lines introduced by the Communists.

Political commissars were suggested

as those persons who should organize and supervise the writing of the
material for publication.
writing.

More than one person should contribute to the

"Articles should take up topics of local interest, and be

educative and critical of concrete things--'concepts of discipline,
democracy, brotherhood toward other formations and the people. 11164
62The Actionist L'Italia Libera had a circulation of 20,000; the
L'Unita, 30,000; the Socialist Avanti!, 15,000; the Liberal Risorgimento
Liberale, 10,000; the Christian Democrat Il Popolo, 10,000. (Bacca, p.
267.)
63 Delzell, pp. 351-352.
64 nelzell, p 351.
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Finally, the decree suggested that political commissars learn the art
of bulletin board use.

65

The Communists realized the value of continuously harassing the
enemy.

This meant that fighting, and fighting whenever possible, was

a necessity.

The Communists hated the concept of attesismo ("watchful

waiting"). 66

This posture of caution was anathma to them; the only way

to win was to be aggressive and to push for "all-out fighting."

As their

organizational and leadership qualities had come to .the fore before, once
again it surfaced in the Communist created Gappisti and later the
Sappisti.

The Gappisti (GAP, Gruppi di Azione Popolare) were urban

guerrilla units who used hit-and-run tactics to cause as much damage
as possible whenever possible to the Germans and the Fascists.

They were

a counterpart to those men who lived in and fought from the mountains.
They were first introduced by the Communists in early 1943, and as a
tactic their value was proved as the Resistance progressed.

A GAP

group usually consisted of three or four boys in their teens who operated
in the large industrial cities under the supervision of a PCI activist.
They moved swiftly and secretly, hitting the enemy and running; they
blew up command posts, assassinated Fascist leaders, and killed eRemy
65
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Delzell, p. 351.

This was a policy adopted by "some right-wing anti-Fascists
early in the partisan campaigns. Because it was often true that in
direct military encounters the partisans were not successful against
German artillery, these anti-Fascists advocated a more cautious policy,
opposed to fighting. They encouraged attesismo or "watchful waiting"
until the Allies' approach was imminent, in the hope of avoiding unnecessary reprisals against civilians. Before very long, the Communists came
to view this policy as one antithetic to their political goals; consequently, they publically, through the press denounced attesismo and called
for an all-out fight.
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sentries.

They gloried in the art of surprise and the constant

harrassment and erosion of the enemy forces.

Though the Gappisti

mortality rate was high--the risk was great--the PC! created and continued to utilize this tactic, as did other partisan groups.

For the

aggressive Communists, it was one more effective element in the fight
against the Germans and Fascists; they felt "that the resul,tant danger
of reprisals was worth the price if it imbued the city folk with the
spirit of recklessness necessary for a more successful insurection. 11 67
The Sappisti were yet another innovative and effective creation of
the Communists.

They first appeared in the Po Valley where their main

task in fighting the enemy was to make sure that the harvest of grain
did not fall into the hands of the Germans and Fascists.

Their theatre

was the valley and if they could not hide the grain, they destroyed it.
Later in 1944 the PCI integrated the Sappisti and Gappisti forces so
that both functioned within the urban areas.

The Sappisti, however,

were usually involved in the protection of factories from sabotage while
68
the Gappisti continued to be the urban attack force against the enemy.
In conclusion, the Gappisti and the Sappisti were introduced by and
sponsored by the PCI.

Like the role of the political commissar,

also introduced and expanded by the Party, they provided another "useful
'capillary organ' of the underground."
In addition to introducing organizational methods as well as
tactical innovations, the PCI provided leadership among the factory
workers in the industrial centers.

Though the workers in the factories

were not technically a part of the Resistance as it is defined in this
67 Delzell, p. 304.

68
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work, they were a large force to be reckoned with and to be utilized in
the fight against the enemy.

More importantly, to the PC!, they were

the proletariat who would help effect the political, economic, and
social change of Italian society in the postwar period.

Partly to demon-

strate their potential political power, but also for the immediate value
to the Resistance movement, the Cormnunist Party planned, through the
CLNAI, and executed the widely based general strike of March, 1944
(another general strike occurred in December of the same year). 69
Through careful and secret planning the strike was executed; it began
on March 1 when several thousand workers in the northern cities stopped
work.

The strike was more extensive in some cities than in others.

In

Milan and in Turin, to a slightly lesser degree, almost all production
was halted for an entire week.

In the city of Florence streetcar workers

struck along side the factory workers; the city's newspaper was not
printed for three days.

In Bologna groups of peasants also demonstrated,

and in Florence the Fascist headquarters ' was burned to the ground by
roaming strikers.

Finally, in such cities as Trieste, Genoa, and

Biella, the strike never really materialized "partly because of prior
wage boosts, fear, and hastily called 'preventive holidays' ascribed to
alleged 'electric' power shortages."

70

In general the strike of March, 1944 was a success; in many of the
cities due to the superior organization and planning skills of the
Communists and to their aggressive ability to agitate, the operation
involved masses of people and functioned smoothly.
69
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But its real success
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was that it accomplished two things that the PC! had argued it would
accomplish, when they had initially introduced their strike plan to the
CLNAI.

First, the strike did succeed in slowing down war production

for Germany; in some of the larger plants production was at a standstill
for a week.

72

Second, and more important to the Party's goals, the

strike "signaled the onset of greater popular hostility td neo-Fascism"
and it appeared to strengthen an attitude of working together to defeat
the enemy.

73

Though the Communists demonstrated that they were effective
leaders, perhaps the leaders, in the Resistance movement, not all that
can be written about them is entirely positive.

There are those who

judge that at times they were too aggressive, too rash and that by
being so they caused more harm than good.

Their actions which precipitated

the infamous Ardeatine Cave massacre is one such incidence.

In the early

spring of 1944 the Gappisti stepped up their terroristic activities in
several cities.

In Rome in particular the Communists felt that the

population was not doing enough to harass the enemy; the citizens
seemed to be apathetic, waiting for the Allied troops to liberate them
from the Germans.

To combat this the Gappisti planned a new series of

violent hit-and-run tactics intended to both damage the Germans and to
stir up the Roman population.

On the afternoon of March 23, a squad of

GAP students executed an attack against a detachment of German security
police.

Every afternoon the police marched

d~wn

a certain street.

disguised students were present at their marching time; one of them
72
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posing as a street cleaner rolled a cart filled with explosives dire c tly
into the marching soldiers, while at the same time his fellow Gappisti
who were hidden began shooting at them.

Thirty-three of the enemy

were killed and many of the others were wounded.
The Germans were furious and determined to take their revenge.
After consultation with many of their leaders, including Hitler, they
decided that they would kill ten Italians for every one German soldier
who had died.
The German Connnand has decided to put a stop to the activity
of these villainous outlaws. No one ought to be able to
sabotage with impunity the newly affirmed Italian-German
collaboration. The German Comnand, thus, has ordered that for
each German assassinated ten Communist and Bodoglio criminals
will be shot. This order has already been executed.74
In the end the number scheduled to die as indicated by the German
Command was not accurate.

335 instead of 320 Italians were executed as

a result of the GAP killing of German police.

Also, not only Communists

and Badogliani died; men from all parties were included in those who
died as a result of the Germans' reprisal.

The victims were chosen

from the prison cells of Regina Coeli and police headquarters, Via
Tasso (An Italian police official aided in the selection from the
prisons), and also from the neighborhood where the GAP students had
attacked and killed the Germans.

On the night of March 24-25, the

Italian reprisal victims were taken to a cave on the outskirts of Rome;
there they were slaughtered.

The Germans shot each of their victims in

the neck, left their bodies in the cave, mining and then sealing the
entrance.
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The Communists, of course, defended their action.
they turned out a fiery
morass" of attesismo.

11

Almost immediately

comunicato 11 which denounced the "hard, thick

They stressed that the guerrilla partisan actions

in Rome would not cease until the Germans had all been driven out of
the city.

They would continue until the Germans were banished from

all of Italy, until Fascism was utterly and completely destroyed, and
until independence and liberty were achieved.

77

Publically the PC! told

the people that
(1) it had not known the Germans would react so brutally;
(2) the Germans did not dare to repeat in Florence or Bologna

such acts of vengeance as those displayed at the Ardeatine
Caves; and (3) the only way to check German violence was to
intensify the underground struggle.78
Once again the Party emphasized for the people what was for it a most
important part of Resistance strategy:

always fight, always aggress

against the enemy.
Unfortunately for the PC!, though the Ardeatine massacre served
to harden the hearts of a good many Italians towards the Germans and
the Italian Social Republic, it also caused repercussions for the Party.
There were those who maintained that the action on the part of the
Gappisti which resulted in the terrible German revenge exacerbated the
very attesismo which they had intended to eradicate.
77

78

Politically, the

Bacca, p. 334.

Delzell, p. 375. After the Ardeatine massacre, the terrorist
attacks continued in other cities. In Florence on April 15, Giovanni
Gentile, the Fascist idealist-philosopher of education, was shot and
killed by unidentified youths in a public street. In Bologna the local
commissioner of the Fascist Federation was assassinated.
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March 23 Rome incident was another element which increased the tension
already existent within the CCLN, "so that henceforth the leftist
parties were on the defensive in the Rome conunittee. 1179
Another criticism of the Communist Party ironically arose out of
a demonstration of their leadership and organizational capability.

In

November of 1943 the High Command of the Garibaldini initiated the idea
of model assault detachments.

A sheet was circulated which explained

the function of such detachments.
Why model detachments? They are created for armed action, for
assault, for bold attack. [There are] assault detachments
because they provide an organization and an iron discipline
suitable to the tasks before us. [There are] assault detachments
because their tradition is inscribed in the best popular and
national traditions, from the Garibaldini of the Risorgimento
to the glorious Garibaldi brigade of Spain.80
This circular most certainly responded to the ardent spirit of the
period, but its tone was typical of all Garibaldini propaganda:

it tended

towards being pompous; it succeeded in ignoring the conditions of the
real struggle; finally, it encouraged Garibaldini to sing their own praises
81
and to tell inflated stories of their accomplishments.
The Communists
would also exhort their fellow fighters to steal arms from the enemy
because they were needed in order to continue the war effort:
armi sono quelle che hail nemico, a cui bisogna strapparle."

"Le
82

Such passionate words were perhaps needed for many of those who were
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reluctant to fight the enemy, but they also were an over-simplification.
They demonstrated an excessive faith in connnandments or rules, though
this was quite understandable coming from a party whose members were
religious-like in their allegiance. 83

Thus, though the Communists

demonstrated exceptional leadership and organizational qualities during
the Resistance movement, they were not always acclaimed.

'lllere were

those who felt, and they documented their feelings, that at times they
pushed too hard and too much, often to the detriment of others in the
overall Resistance movement.
PCI participation in the Resistance was successful in that the
Germans and the Fascists went down to defeat.

It was not successful

in that the party's second purpose for participating in the movement
was not realized.

It was not able to effect the political, economic,

and social change it had hoped for.

Because of the strength of the

conservative, traditional elements in Italian society and because of the
presence of Allied troops on Italian soil, the Communists and their plans
for a new order were effectively neutralized.

An examination of exactly

why they failed goes beyond present purposes.

What is being asserted

here, and examined, is the fact that the PCI was oriented politically
as well as militarily in its participation in the Resistance.

A study

of the PCI and its political movements during the period 1943-1945
offers ample evidence that the Party utilized every opportunity to
broaden its base of power:

it was intent upon reinforcing its position

in the norhtern CLNs and in employing that position to "reshape the
patterns of Italy's public life. 84
83
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Concomitantly, the actions of the
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Allies towards the Communists also implied that they feared the potential
power of the PCI.
When the CLNAI was created in January, 1944, it was quickly
apparent that it was dominated by the leftist parties, and in particular
by the Communist Party.

Because of this, from the beginning it, like

most northern CLNs posited a revolutionary program. 85

One of the first

directives dispatched by the CLNAI was at the instigation of the PCI,
and it left no doubt as to the Party's future political intentions.
There will be no place tomorrow among us for a reactionary
regime, however masked, nor for a limp democracy. The new
political, social, and economic system will not be other than
a clear and effective democracy. The CLN of today is a prefiguration of the government of tomorrow. In tomorrow's
government this is certain: workers, peasants, artisans, all
the popular classes will have a determining weight, and a
place adequate to this weight; .•. 86
The PC! was saying plainly and publicly that the old order would have
to be destroyed.

The rigid privileged class structure would have to

give way to a society in which all classes had equal say.

The Party

hinted at the concept that the uncorrupted CLNs would be the vehicles
by which the necessary social, economic, and political change would be
wrought.

In its CLNAI order the PC! revealed how seriously it "dreamed

of the regeneration of the nation by its own new 'democratic elite'."
In addition to the above declaration of the PCI via the CLNAI
apparatus, the same directive issued by the Milan organ also

stated

the following;
85
86
87

Clough, Saladino, p. 527.
Norman Kogan, Italy and the Allies (Cambridge, 1956), p. 103.
Delzell, p. 555.

87

105

... and a place adequate to this weight will be held by the
parties which represent them. Among these is the Communist
Party, which is included in the CLN on a plane of perfect parity
with the other parties, with equal fulness of authority today
and of power tomorrow ..• Against the affirmations of anticommunist proposals .•. we must reaffirm the unity ••• that links the
five parties. Whoever works against this union of them works
against the Nation. We direct this warning especially to certain
industrial and financial circles.88
Thus, the Communists used the CLNAI to their advantage.

It was a

base from which they could operate to publicize and to organize their
political objectives for the reshaping of Italian society.

It also

provided a forum where they could reinforce their party position, and
therefore their power.

In terms of numbers alone the leftist parties

in the CLNAI "overawed" the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, and
custom in the Po Valley region did not dictate unanimity in CLN voting
as was the case in the CCLN. 89
Another way in which the Communists demonstrated their political
orientation throughout the Resistance was their activity through the
CLNs to set up local governments wherever the Germans had been successfully driven out.

Through this process they were establishing models for

self-government which would be workable and useful towards their aims
in the postwar rebuilding period.

When the partisans succeeded in

liberating an area such as an Apennine valley, they set about administrating
the area basing their methods on those utilized by the Yugoslavian
partisans.

They attempted to set up two sets of forces.

designed to be on the alert for any enemy counterattack.

One was
The other was

responsible for fashioning some form of government or administration for
88
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the population.

These partisan republics, as they can be termed,

provided the local citizens with "their first experience in partial
self-government in more than two decades. 1190
In order to facilitate the organization of a workable governing
situation CLNs located in the area, or at times the patriot band which
had liberated the valley, set up giunte popolari annninistrative (popular
administrative juntas).
body. 91

These juntas supplanted any military regulatory

The PCI was as much as possible a present and an integral

part of this process of establishing self-government.

The Garibaldini

usually sent into the area "civil delegates;" these were individuals
who were skilled in organizational methods like the political commissars,
but who, unlike the commissars, had no military duties.
would lay the groundwork for elections.

These delegates

According to the Communists, the

composition of the juntas was such that they were representative of the
social class make-up of the area in which they functioned.

Thus, the

PCI established a pattern whereby the selection of candidates for office
gave the majority of seats "to the poorest classes who were in the majority
in the countryside."

92

In addition to mapping out the political complexion

of the liberated areas, the juntas also dealt with the distribution of
food, tried to hold down prices, and issued commercial licenses.

It is

interesting to note that one of the more successful republics was that
of the Republic of Carnia located in the Venetia-Julia.

Here, from the

beginning, the Communists were the "propelling force" in the local CLN.
90
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Once again their aggressiveness and serious intent was demonstrated.
They vigorously set about to organize their administrative unit.

Im.med-

iately they broadened the base of the CLN by inviting "youth fronts,
defense of women groups, and other fringe mass agencies" to join the
Committee in establishing a "popular progressive democracy."

Also, in

keeping with the PCI line, the purge was enacted in Carnia, with people's
tribunals set up to carry out the cleansing process.93
The importance of the establishment of the republics by the
partisans in northern Italy did not go unnoticed by the Allies.

In fact,

they viewed them as an "implied threat to the authority of the recognized
government in liberated Italy...

94

The particular case of the creation

of the Republic of Domodossola in the Alps points out the seriousness with
which the Allies regarded this leftist venture concerning the republics.
In October, 1944, Val d'Ossola located in the Alps fell to the partisans.
They proceeded to establish headquarters at Domodossola, the most
populous center in the area.

They declared the creation of the Republic

of Domodossola, but the partisans did not stop there.

They publicized

their intentions of extending the Republic until it was the Republic of
Italy.

Though the Communists were not the prime movers in Domodossola--

there was considerable conflict between the leftist and the rightists
over the setting up of an administrative agency--their presence and
the incident itself serve to illustrate that "there were some political
misgivings regarding the future behavior of the Communists developing
in the minds of Churchill and other British officials (and some American
93

94

Delzell, p. 430.
Kogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 106.
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ones too ) in Italy ...

II

95

They were becoming particularly nervous as

events in Poland, Greece, and other places in eastern Europe unfolded;
therefore the Allies did not hesitate to react to what they regarded as
a threat to their policy being enacted in Italy.

At an Allied Control

Council meeting, shortly after the announcement promulgating the
Republic of Domodossola, it was announced that "publicity on Patriot
activities would now be definitely played down particularly behind the
Allied lines. 1196

Future policy dictated . that more of the spotlight be

given to those in the Italian army instead of showering the partisans
with glorious publicity.
It is useful to note at this juncture that from the beginning
(autumn of 1943) there was conflict between the Allies and the partisans
centering on each group's ideas of what the role and the objectives of
the partisans should be.

The disagreement was political in nature.

On

the one side the partisans wanted to organize large contingents of men
so that their campaigns would be successful and they would be able to
keep control of the territory they had captured.
other hand, clearly did not approve of this.

The allies, on the

They suspected the leftist

partisan elements, which after all provided the leadership of the
Resistance movement.

They saw in their demands for large armies a

direct threat to the Italian government already established in the
South and supported by the Allies as the only legitimate government now
and in the future.
95

96
97

97

They did not want to allow a situation in Italy

Delzell, p. 432.
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whereby the partisans in capturing territories would establish their own
governments in the areas, and in the end would use these governments to
defy the authority of the Italian government already set up in the
liberated portion of the country.
The establishment of the CLNAI by the Milan CLN in January, 1944
in effect brought about the political unity of the Resistance.

Tilere was,

however, no real mechanism in existence which could coordinate the military
activities of the movement.

1be partisans groups continued to function

as individual entities until military consolidation took place in the
spring of the same year.
was instituted.

At that time some organization among the units

Detachments (about fifty men) were organized into brigades

(about 450 men) and brigades

~nto

divisions (about 1350men).

98

Tilough

this organizational activity was a beginning, it was not enough; there
was too much competition between different political groupings, and at
times actual fighting broke out among them.

In order to stop this

useless internal conflict, and in an effort to streamline military
operations, the CLNAI created its own organ for the task in June, 1944.
On

the 9th of June it launched the General Headquarters, Corps of Volun-

teers of Liberty (CG/CVL) in Milan.

99

A hierarchical military structure embracing all partisan units
associated with the political parties, by this time the great
majority, was thus established. Regional military commands
were set up to work with the regional CLNs.100
The conflict which evolved between General Raffaele Cadorna, the
man appointed by Premier Bonomi to serve as military advisor to the CG/CVL,
98Kogan,
99
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100Kogan,
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and the PCI (ftlong with other leftists) offers another illustration of
the Conununists' determination to maintain its leadership position in
the Resistance.

When General Cadorna arrived in Milan to take up his

position, there developed a long period of misunderstandings and disagreements between him and the CLNAI concerning his duties and "perogatives. 11
..• the general argued that he could not serve very helpfully
as 'technical consultant' in irregular guerrilla warfare;
what he hoped to do was transform the Resistenza Armata into
an efficient fighting force that would be loyal to the government in Rome and have no political overtones of its own.101
He further indicated that it was his task, at the behest of the Allied
Supreme Headquarters, to take over the command of the northern military
forces.
parti~s

From the beginning Cadorna's plans were supported by the
of the right, the PLI and the DC, as well as by the Autonomi

leadership.

The PCI, on the other hand, stood in direct opposition to

him and to his proposed role.

Fundamentally, they distrusted Cadorna

and his possible future actions.

They noted that he was accompanied by

a British major, Major Churchill, who make no secret of his anti-CLNAI
sentiments.

They suspected that if Cadorna actually took over the

direction of the northern forces, officers loyal to the King, and to
what the King stood for, would then "infiltrate CVL headquarters and
compromise the political autonomy of the entire underground."

102

Thus,

the PCI dragged its feet concerning Cadorna's interpretation of his role.
In fact, the Party was able to win in this particular conflict.

The

disagreement itself lasted for a long time; it was not until February
of 1945, through many ups and downs for Cadorna including an attempted
101

Delzell, p. 414.

102 Delzell, p. 415.
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resignation on his part, that an agreement was finally reached.

Io that

agreement Cadorna acquiesced to the fact that his role was subordinate
to that of the CLNAI as long as he was not issued orders in conflict
with those issued by the Allies or the CCLN.

Cadorna had finally

succumbed to the hard line maintained by the CLNAI since the beginning
of the conflict in June, 1944.

The Connnittee for the Liberation of

Upper Italy had made clear to him its stance.

The CG/CVL was a

working section of the CLNAI. It is evident, therefore, that
where the Command must take decisions and issue orders having
political character, it is impossible to proceed except through
the collegial consultation of all its members who at that
moment represent the CLNAI, which is the body from which their
power derives •.. 103
There is no question that the Communists wanted power and that they
continually agitated to achieve that status and to extend it.

Throughout

the Resistance to the very eve of the liberation in 1945, they continually
prodded and pushed to be recognized intheir goals.
a notice was

circulat~d

In August, 1944

by the CLNAI in occupied Italy which stated

that it, the CLNAI, was the representative of the Italian government and
in being so possessed the powers of the government.

The notice went a

step further by giving the authority to the CLNs of the regions and
104
provinces to act likewise.
Pushing their actions further, the following month the Upper Northern Committee sent a representative directly to
the Allies to obtain their recognition as the representative of the
Italian government in occupied territory.
the request.
103
104

The Allies of course denied

Since they habitually became the governmental authority

Delzell, p. 484.
Kogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 106.
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in just liberated regions, they did not want to be interfered with by
local CLNs who injected and demanded their own priorities.

105

Because the partisan effort was of meaningful value to the Allies,
an agreement as to their status was eventually achieved, though it
was not to their long-range advantage.

When in December, 1944 Fremier

Bonomi agreed to recognize the CLNAI as the Italian government's delegate with full powers to that part of Italy which was occupied, it
looked like a victory for the leftists and the Communists.

In effect

it was not, for the terms of the armistice precluded that possibility.
The terms had already dictated that the Italian government seated in
Rome was held by the Allied Governments to be "the sole successor of
the Government •.• and ••• the only legitimate authority in that part of
Italy which has been, or will later be restored to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government."
On

106

May Day, the eve of the surrender of the German armies in

Italy, the political movements of the PCI were still in high gear.
It continued to prod the Italian leaders and the Italian people into
radically changing the structure of their society.

On that first day

of May, Luigi Longo, the long-time clandestine Communist leader and
veteran of the Spanish Civil War, exhorted the people to demand of the
Roman government that the direction for the new popular progressive
democracy begin now.

He charged the Italians with making clear to

Rome the following:
(1) The northern patriots are not at all pleased with the
wishy-washy way in which the purge was proceeding in the South.
lOSKogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 106.
106Kogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 107.
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(2) A new, 'popular' goverrunent must be placed in the hands of
'energetic, determined' men who never have compromised with
Fascism and who have known how 'to accomplish the miracle of
liberating their country.' 'It must be tied solidly to the
masses and popular organizations arising out of the fire of the
insurrection.' (3) There must be wide participation by
workers in factory administration. 'We demand ..• that workers,
clerks, and technicians participate in the manner set forth by
the CLNAI in its decree regarding the administration of production on a level of absolute equality with the owners. 1 107

W7

Delzell, p. 557.

CHAPTER VI
EPILOGUE
Though politically they prodded here and pushed there throughout
the Resistance, gaining ground at times, losing it at others, the
Communists were not able to succeed in their program to revolutionize
Italian society.

In 1945 the situation in Italy seemed to be one

of imminent political and social revolution.

The working classes,

agitated by the experience of fighting a war through a decisive role
in the Resistance and impressed with the success of the Communists in
Eastern Europe seemed impatient and eager to better tneir lives thro.ugh
1
a radical reform of their society.
But nothing happened in Italy .
.•• the revolution failed to occur. Three years after the
revolutionary high tide of May and June 1945, the forces of
conservatism won an overwhelming electoral victory. In
.
exactly the same length of time as it had tak~n the earlier
wave of protest to spend itself, [referring to the post World
War I atmosphere in Italy] the second flood of Italian revolutionary consciousness had ended in frustration and disillusionment. 2
For the PCI, on the eve of the liberation from the Germans, Luigi
Longo had expressed the highest of hopes.

3

The difficulty, however,

"of sustaining a revolutionary politics in an arena--parliament
1
H. Stuart Hughes, The United States and Italy (Cambridge, 1953),
p. 143.
2

Hughes, p. 143.

3see Chapter V, "The PCI and the Resistance."
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that deals primarily in a politics of interest ••• " proved too complex.

4

It took only two, very short years, until May, 1947, for the PCI,
accused of not promoting "solidarity within the state administration
and in the legislation on public matters," to lose its well-cultivated
representation in the government, a position it has not retrieved for
some twenty-nine years.

5

In viewing briefly the period from 1945,

when the PCI still participated in the government as part of a six party
coalition, to 1947 when it was "expelled," two factors are clear:
Togliatti's party had failed in the realization of its economic objectives,
and it had failed in maintaining its irmnediate political objective, that
of participating in the government.
The "labor arm" of the Communist Party was the Italian General
Confederation of Labor (CGIL) which had been created in 1944 through
the fusion of the Marxist-dominated General Confederation of Labor
(CGL) and the Catholic Italian Confederation of Laborers, both preFascist trade unions.

6

In 1946 through the CGIL the PCI put forth its

economic objectives:
4

Sidney Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Haven,

1967), p. 128.

5 .
Simon Serfaty, "An International Anomaly: The United States and
the Communist Parties in France and Italy, 1945-1947," Studies in
Comparative Communism An International Interdisciplinary Journal, VIII
(Spring and Summer, 1975), p. 143.
6

When the CGIL was created by the Pact of Rome in 1944, the
three mass parties, the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, and the
Connnunists shared in its leadership. From the beginning, however, the
Communists, under the guiding hand of Giuseppe Di Vittorio, began to
take over the leadership. In 1949 the Christian Democrats left the
CGIL and formed their own Italian Confederation of Trade Unions called
CSIL. (Maurice F. Neufeld, Italy: School for Awakening Countries
(Ithaca, 1961), pp. 454-473.
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In the industrial field, the party proposes the nationalization of large monopolistic combines, big banks and insurance
companies; the institution of national planning and of a
system of national control of production, the first step
in which will be the general establishment and recognition of
management councils. 7
In effect the PCI was advocating a dual control of indwitry.

As a

first and necessary step towards the realization of their broader economic
program the management councils would include both representatives of
the workers and representatives of the factory owners.

It was for the

Party a major move towards the viability of the principle that workers as
well as employers have the right to an imput as to "how and according to
what criteria the productive factors which they represented should be
.

combined."

8

During this early postwar period the PCI through its

leadership role in the CGIL attempted to achieve this concept of dual
control by establishing worker-management councils in industry, a modern
form of Gramsci's Consigli of 1919-20.

They were unsuccessful.

To

Italian private enterprise, the idea of sharing decisions with its employees
was inconceivable; consequently, it exerted pressure on the government in
Rome to veto the CGIL solution to economic recovery problems.

Rome was

quite responsive to this entrepreneurial pressure, as well as to
foreign pressures from the West, and in the immediate postwar liberation
period the government denied legal recognition to the existence of
worker-management councils.

As

a result, the idea of councils, as well

as a few which had in fact existed from pre-liberation days, disappeared
7
Fulvio Bellini, "The Italian CP Part II: The Transformation
of a Party 1921-1945," Problems of Communism, V (January-February, 1956),
p. 42.
8

.

Bellini, Part II, p. 43.
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in 1945 and 1946, and though the Constitution of 1947 affirmed their
right to exist, they never flourished.
In general, the revolutionary consigli di gestione [management
councils] were superseded by less pretentious commissioni
interne ('internal commissions,' or shop-stewards' committees),
which had originated early in the century as liaison agencies
between management and labor for the settlement of disputes
over labor contracts ••• In their postwar incarnation these
shop-stewards' committees operated chiefly as conciliatory and
liaison bodies between management and labor, and were consulted
in certain disciplinary and purge cases, in modifying ~ours of
labor, and in administration of social-security funds.
Thus, by the end of the year 1947, it was clear that the ideas of the
Communists in the economic sphere had not succeeded even at the initial
stage.

Instead of an economy which offered an environment in which the

worker could have his say concerning production, to the contrary, the
Italian economy was being restructured in the old, pre-Fascist mold of
private enterprise with the owners of industry being in firm and absolute
control.
Shortly after returning to Italy in 1944, Togliatti had made it
very clear to Italians in general and to his fellow party members that
"We are no longer a sect of agitators but have assumed the responsibility
of a great party. 1110

Implicit in his words was the overriding desire

for the PCI to participate in the government and in this they succeeded,
but only for a very brief period.

When the Parri government fell in

November, 1945, Alcide De Gasperi the leader of the Christian Democrats
was chosen as the best hope to form a new government.
and 1953 he would head eight Italian cabinets.)
9

charles F. Delzell, Mussolini's Enemies
Fascist Resistance (Princeton, 1961), p. 558.
10

Bellini, Part II, p. 42.

(Between 1945

From the beginning
The Italian Anti-
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tension grew between the Right and Center and the Left.

This first

De Gasperi government still consisted of the six party coalition

which had existed throughout the 1943-1945 war years, but it was the
last time that all the parties would work together.
During his first term in office two major acts carried out by
De Gasperi indicated a move to the right politically.

First he began

the removal of local adtdnistrators who had been appointed by the CLNs
in the northern provinces inunediately after the Liberation.

He

replaced them with officials who had been the very bureaucrats before
and during Fascism that the Communists wanted no part of in the
11
restructuring of Italian society.
Second, he endorsed an indefinite
termination of the purge trials.

This again was in direct opposition

to the insistence of the Communists and other leftists that Italy must
be cleansed of those elements which had made it possible for Fascism to
exist.

Further, they were adamant that these same elements not be

allowed to hold office or other responsible positions in society, a
factor which did not receive support through De Gasperi's termination
act.

Though during this same time period the PCI was able to demonstrate

strength among the people--out of 7,572 administrative districts the joint
Socialist-Communist ticket received 2,256 in the administrative elections
of March 10, 1946, and in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of
June 2, 1946, the Communists received 104 seats along with the Socialists'
115--tension caused by disagreement in policy continued to mount among
the parties serving in the government.
11

12

Giuseppe Mammarella, Italy After Fascism
1943-1965 (Notre Dame, 1966), p. 107.
12

Mammarella, pp. 108 and 116.
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The second De Gasperi government inaugurated in July, 1946,
ushered in the "tripartite coalition."
parties represented in this cabinet.

In actuality there were four
In addition to the Christian

Democrats, the Socialists, and the Communists, the Republican Party
had also entered the coalition.

They remained, however, isolated from

the other three parties; their political clout was miniscule in comparison to them.

During this round of government the conflict between

the Christian Democrats on one hand, and the Communists and the Socialists
on the other hand, which had begun to come into sharp focus during the
initial months of De Gasperi's leadership became even more apparent.
For one, in their efforts to begin work on rebuilding Italy economically,
the Christian Democrats chose to support an economic policy which
openly favored and encouraged private enterprise while the Communists
promulgated eradication of monopolistic methods, the institution of
national control of production, and the establishment of national planning
(discussed above).

For another, De Gasperi continued in his campaign

to dismiss CLN appointed officials.

The prefects who had been designated

by the CLNs after Liberation were either discharged from their duties
or forced to submit their resignations.

The plan of the PCI to restructure

Italian society with new and forward looking party advocates failed.
De Gasperi replaced the CLN prefects with "career functionaries of
conservative, anti-Connnunist sentiment."

13

Perhaps the most damaging action, as far as the Communists and
their program was concerned, was De Gasperi's conscious move to keep the
important Foreign and Interior ministries' portfolios from them.
13

Mammarella, p. 136.
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In substance, the aim of De Gasperi and the DC was to
deprive the left-wing parties of their most effective weapon,
that of political pressure exercised through their control of
the masses. The righ~ maintained that it was ·only by reestablishing an atmosphere of security that conditions favorable to
the development of private initiative and the reconstruction could
be created. With this goal in view, De Gasperi, who in additinn
to the tasks of Prime Minister also held the portfolio of the
Minister of the Interior and as such was responsible for public
order, undertook to reinforce the police organs in order to
reconstitute the weapon traditionally at the service of the
state and the political forces in power.14
Within the same framework De Gasperi also launched a program, beginning
in Emilia, of searching for and rounding up arms caches left over from
the Resistance movement.

The searches for weapons which continued for

several years and which spread to other sections in northern and central
Italy netted a vast store of arms material.

The salient point is that

many of the weapons gathered were found in the hands of Communist
party members, and the Christian Democrats along with right wing elements
in the society utilized this fact to their political advantage:

they

preyed on the fears cf the Italian upper and middle classes by insisting
that the presence of weapons affirmed the "existence of a paramilitary
organization supported by the Communist Party," and they piously
15
condemned the threat that it posed to Italian democracy.
The PCI expressed adamant opposition to De Gaspari and his
tactics.

They answered his accusations by denouncing him and his

actions in the cabinet and stirring up the population to resist his
course of action which they assured the people was a ploy to restore
power to those who had condoned and supported the Fascist regime.
Because of a shake-up in the Socialist Party--it split into
two factions at its national congress in January, 1947--and the consequent
14Mammarella, p. 135.
15

Mammarella, p. 136.
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resignations it triggered in the Ltalian government, De Gasperi dissolved
his second government in January of 1947. 16
February.

He formed a new cabinet in

The Communists and the Nenni Socialists, plus two indepen-

dents joined him.

During this snort government--from February to

May-- 11 the open political conflict between the Communists and the
Christian Democrats ••• had by now reached the breaking point."

17

For

the parties in power more problems awaited solution, and the process
did not invite agreement.

The two parties were unable to come to an

accord on the immediate problem of inflation.
salaries and cut public spending.
unyielding opposition.

One wanted to freeze

The other met this proposal with

At the international level tension increased

as a result of the Truman doctrine.
The Communists, in line with Moscow policy, condemned the
Truman Doctrine and compared its aims to 'ideological political
motivations analogical to those habitual to German imperialism.'
The Christian Democrats and the entire moderate and conservative
opinion extolled Truman's decision, s~eing in it as well a
guarantee for the security of Italy.1 8
All of these factors which had been putting stress upon the
coalition governments causing friction between the Right and the Left,
between the Christian Democrats and the Communists, finally came to

16

On January 9, Giuseppe Saragat and Matteo Matteotti, the
moderates of the PSIUP, walked out of the national congress and formed
the Socialist Party of the Italian Workers (PSLI). They opposed the
wing of the PSIUP which wanted continued collaboration with the PCI.
The part of the party left under the leadership of Nenni re-adopted
the original name of the Socialist Party, Partitio Socialista Italiano
(PSI).
17
18

Mammarella, p. 144.
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rupture.

19

In late April, 1947, De Gasperi publically denounced the

PCI as being uncooperative and disloyal to the solidarity of the
government.

He appealed for someone, some group to work with him in

"concrete collaboration. 11
ment.

On May 12 he resigned from his third govern-

When he was charged to form his fourth, he did not ask the PCI

to join.

In fact, on the last day of May, 1947, he formed the first

postwar one-party government.
De Gasperi's fourth government marked the end of a period which
had existed since 1943.

The collaboration between the anti-Fascist

parties was a thing of the past.

More importantly, the position for

which the PCI had compromised and maneuvered was lost to it:

it no

longer was a participant in the government.
During the next year the Christian Democrats were able to make
the gains they needed to stay in power.

Their most important objective

of combating inflation and stabilizing the lira bore results within
months of initiation of their program.

Further, the Party was able to

withstand two non-confidence votes in the Constituent Assembly.
19

In

.
During De Gasperi's second government (which began in July,
1946) UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration)
assistance to Italy ended. In December of 1946 De Gasperi traveled
to the United States, and the question of U.S. post-UNRRA aid for Italy
was discussed. Though the U.S. Government did not explicitely state that
it would not give aid to the Italians if the Communists were allowed to
continue as participants in the government of De Gasperi, in Senator
Vandenberg's words, the United States did "not want to waste [its]
resources aiding tendencies that are contrary to [its] principles and [its]
goal of internal and international dempcracy." In the latter part of
1947, after the Communists had in fact been dropped from De Gasperi 1 s
fourth cabinet, the U.S. Ambassador to Italy sent the following Top
Secret communique to Washington: "Now that a government has been
formed by the Christian Democrats .•.. with outside experts but without
Communists or their affiliates I recommend most strongly that our
government take whatever steps may be possible to demonstrate our
support and readiness to aid in their efforts to save the lira and secure
their economy." Pressure from the United States, then, was yet another
factor leading up to De Gasperi's PCI policy. (Serfaty, pp. 137-144.)
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fact, it became clear that the Christian Democratic experiment in
government, without the Communists participating, was working.

Consequently,

in the middle of December, 1946, the Republicans and the Social Democrats agreed to work with the Christian Democrats, and a new government
of four parties was formed which was to last for almost five years,
and was to provide a reasonably long period of political stability and
which was to make reconstruction a reality.

Having been unable to dis-

credit the viability of the Christian Democrats, the Communists, now
having been out of the government for almost a year, prepared for the
all important general political elections to be held in April, 1948.
They had failed to produce revolution in Italy, and these elections
were the last chance for the Communists to take the lead from the
consolidation forces of the Christian Democrats and the Republicans
and the Social Democrats.
Psychologically, in terms of the improved economic situation, the
Christian Democrats had an edge.

The middle and upper classes felt

better about the ways things were going in Italy.

During the period

before the elections, the international situation caused considerable
concern and posed an issue which the De Gasperi government was able to
use to its advantage.

The gradual absorption of Eastern European

countries into the orbit of Soviet control and the build-up of Soviet
troops along East-West borders was made into a campaign issue, and the
Christian Democrats hammered away at the fact that this election would
decide whether Italy would be free .to decide her own political destiny
or whether she also would succumb to Communism.

With the East-West

Cold War in its initial stages, both the Soviet Union and the United
States watched the Italian election with interest; in fact, each did

124
more.

Both major powers contributed to the campaign which would enhance

the prospect of an Italy firmly tied to an alliance with them.
For the Connnunists the elections of 1948 produced a bitter
aftermath for all the energies they had expended against Fascism and
for the restructuring and rebuilding of Italy.

The Christian Democrats

won a decisive victory with a little over 48 percent of the vote
while the Communists and the Socialists, on a combined Popular Front
ticket, gathered only 31 percent of the vote, almost one million fewer
votes than they had received in the 1946 elections.

20

It appeared that

the Christian Democratic decision to rule without the PCI had been
confirmed.

20
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APPENDIX
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

JANUARY, 1943-DECEMBER, 1946
1943
10 July
17 July
19 July
24 July
25 July
26 July
5 August
17 August
3 September

8 September
9 September
10 September
11 September
15 September
18
19
23
24
29
30

September
September
September
September
September
September
1 Ocotber
7 October
13 October
1 November
10 November
12 November

Allies land in Sicily.
AMGOT begins to function in Sicily.
First bombing of Rome
Hitler and Mussolini meet at Feltre.
Meeting of the Fascist Grand Council.
Grandi's motion accepted by a two-thirds majority.
Mussolini dimissed and arrested.
Marshal Badoglio becomes Prime Minister.
Martial Law proclaimed in Italy.
Badoglio forms a Cabinet Fascist Party dissolved.
Capture of Catania.
End of resistance in Sicily.
Armistice signed in Sicily by General Castellano,
but not announced.
First Allied landing on Italian mainland, in
Calabria.
Announcement of armistice. Italy surrenders
unconditionally.
Allied landing at Salerno.
Rome occupied by German troops.
Italian fleet makes formal surrender at Malta.
King Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio withdraw to Bari.
Mussolini set free by the Germans.
Mussolini organizes the Republican Fascist Party
and assumes supreme direction of Fascism in Italy.
Pavolini appointed temporary Secretary.
Mussolini makes statement on German radio.
Germans evacuate Sardinia.
Formation of the neo-Fascist Government announced.
Offensive by Fifth Army from Salerno opens.
Full armistice terms signed by Badoglio at Malta.
Badoglio forms preliminary Cabinet.
Allies enter Naples.
Count Sforza arrives in Italy.
Italy declares war on Germany and becomes a cobelligerent of the Allies.
Broadcast of declaration of Moscow Conference
(19-30 October) on Italy.
Formation of Allied Control Commission for Italy .
General Roatta removed from post of Chief of
Staff, Italian Army.
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1943
14 November
16 November
28 December

First National Assembly of the Republican Fascist
Party at Verona, Manifesto embodying draft
Constitution of Italian Social Republic issued.
Badoglio forms Cabinet.
Ortona captured by Eighth Army.

1944
8 January
11 January
22 January
28 January

11 February

13 March
March
March
March
April

15
23
26
4

17 April
20
23
11
18
22

April
April
May
May
May

25 May
4 June
5 June
6 June
...,
June
I
9 June
22 June
Early July

15 July
18 July

Trial of Ciano and other members of Fascist Grand
Council opens at Verona.
Ciano and four others shot.
Allied forces land at Anzio.
Bari Congress of the six parties represented on the
Conunittees of National Liberation.
Transfer of Allied-occupied territory to the Badoglio
Government, i.e. of territory south of northern
boundaries of Salerno, Potenza, and Bari provinces,
and the islands of Sicily and Sardinia.
Diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. resumed.
Fifth Army launches offensive at Cassino.
Fosse Ardeatine murders.
Togliatti returns to Italy.
Sir Noel Charles appointed High Couunissioner for
Italy.
Badoglio resigns; asked by King to form new
Government.
Badoglio forms a new Ministry on a broader basis.
Mussolini meets Hitler in Germany.
Allies launch large offensive on Gustav Line.
Capture of Cassino.
General Alexander issues first Italian partisan
communique.
Fifth Army link up with Anzio beachhead.
Allies enter Rome
King of Italy signs a decress making Prince Umberto
Lieutenant General of the Realm.
D Day
General Alexander makes first broadcast to
Italian patriots in North Italy.
Ivanoe Bonomi forms a new Government.
Ministers take oath; Bonomi Cabinet's first
meeting at Salerno.
Strikes in Northern towns; partisans active.
Germans taking over authority (especially military)
from neo-Fascists.
Bonomi Government transfers from Salerno to Rome.
Poles capture Ancona.
Partisans to be incorporated in the Italian
army organization.

131

1944
19 July
20 July
21 July
27 July
2 August
5 August
8 August

10 August
13 August
15 August
End August
18 September
27 September
4 October
16 October
16 November
20 November
26 November
28 November
5 December
10 December

14 December

U.S. forces occupy Leghorn.
Provinces of Foggia, Campobasso, Benevento,
Avellino, and Naples (except commune of Naples)
transferred to Italian Government jurisdiction
Mussolini received by Hitler (after attempt on
Hitler's life on 20th).
Epuration law passed.
Graziani appointed c.-in-C. of new army of Italian
and German divisions.
Eighth Army occupies Florence south of the Arno.
Communist-Socialist joint programme of action
issued.
Mr. Churchill in Italy till 28th.
Florence clear of Germans.
Provinces of Littoria, Frosinone, and Rome, and
town of Rome restored to Italian Government
jurisdiction.
Gothic Line reached.
Caruso's trial.
Churchill-Roosevelt declaration regarding status of
Italy.
Mr. Eden's statement in House of Commons regarding Italian colonies.
Provinces of Viterbo, Rieti, Aquila, Chieti,
Pescara, and Teramo pass under Italian Government
jurisdiction.
General Roatta arrested
Count Carandini arrives in London as Italian
representative
Cabinet crisis; Bonomi resigns.
British objections to Count Sforza's candidature
as Foreign Minister.
Eighth Army occupies Ravenna.
Second Bonomi Government announced; Socialists
and Action Party refuse to collaborate.
Canadian troops enter Faenza.

1945
15 January
18 January

Allied direct control over Italian press ends.
Tarchiani appointed Italian Ambassador in Washington.

24 February

Mr. Harold MacMillan's announcement regarding

4 March
8 March
22 March
31 March

relaxation of conditions hitherto limiting Italian
Government's freedom of action.
General Roatta escapes during trial.
Agreement signed between Italian Government and
U.N.R.R.A. representative in Italy.
Mussolini's speech on 26th anniversary of the
foundation of Fasci di Combattimento.
Council of Ministers approves proposal for "Consulta."
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1945
2
10
14
19
21
24
25

April
April
April
April
April
April
April

26 April

27 April
28 April

29 April
30 April
1 May

2 May
3 May
5 May
8 May
12 May
13 May
16 May
19 May
22 May
25 May

Eighth Army landing near Lake Comacchio.
Eighth Army crosses the Senio.
Fifth Army advancing on Bologna.
Strikes in Turin and Milan begin.
Capture of Bologna.
Eighth Army occupies Ferrara.
Fifth Army enters Mantua and Parma.
Partisans attack and take over in Milan.
Fifth Army occupies Verona and crosses Adige.
Germans surrender to partisans in Genoa; most of
Turin in patriot hands.
C.N.L.A.I. takes over control in North.
Fifth Army enters Genoa and Piacenza.
Mussolini arrested at village on Lake Como.
Mussolini and other leading Fascists, including
Pavolini and Farinacci, executed by patriots.
Fifth Army takes Brescia and Bergamo, U.&.
troops reach Como, Eighth Army reaches Venice and
Mestre, New Zealand Division reaches the Piave.
Instrument of surrender of German armies in Italy
signed at Caserta.
Patriots liberate Turin.
Partisans fighting Germans in Trieste.
Graziani calls on Ligurian armies to lay down arms.
New Zealand troops reach Udine and make contact
with Marshal Tito's forces which have entered
Trieste.
Surrender of German armies in Italy announced.
New Zealanders enter Trieste.
Germans in Trieste surrender to New Zealanders;
Yugoslavs occupy municipal buildings there.
C.N.L.A.I. representatives arrives in Rome.
General Morgan meets Tito in Belgrade and suggests
withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Trieste area.
Field Marshal Alexander in Belgrade discussing
Trieste question with Tito.
C.N.L.A.I. leaders return North.
Ministers go North for further discussions.
Field Marshal Alexander issues statement protesting
against Tito's claims in Venezia Giulia.
Eighth Army takes over Trieste.
Six-party agreement reached in Milan as to pro-

gramme for new Government; Ministers return to
28 May
1 June
2 June

Rome.
"Cordon sanitaire" between North and South ends.
A.M.G. (Lombardy) issues order regarding end of
C.N.L.A.I. authority in North; C.N.L.A.I. decree s
to be replaced by A.M.G. orders.
Six-party agreement regarding powers of C.N.L.s.

133

1945
9 June

12 June
17 June
19 June
20 June
14 July
3 August
4 August
9 August
30 August

15 September
17 September
18 September
19 September
25 September
2 October
3 October
8 October
12 October
18 October
6 November
9 November
15 November
17
22
24
1

November
November
November
December

SOURCE:

Agreement signed in Belgrade between British, U.S.,
and Yugoslav Governments defining limits of A.M.G.
control in Venezia Giulia.
Bonomi resigns.
British and Americans take over in Trieste; Yugoslav
troops withdraw.
Ferruccio Parri asked to form Government.
Provinces of Florence, Leghorn, and Pistoia transferred to Italian Government control.
Parri Government formed.
Italo-Yugoslav agreement signed, completing that
of 9 June, and defining limits of 'Morgan Line.'
Italy declares war on Japan.
Potsdam decisions announced; Italy to be admitted
to U.N.O. after peace treaty concluded.
Emilia, Apuania, Lucca, and town of Ancona
handed back to Italian Government control.
Val d'Aosta Autonomy Bill passed.
Commission for preparation of electoral law set
up.
Lombardy, Veneta, Piedmont, and Liguria restored
to Italian Government control, leaving Udine,
Trento, Belluno, and Balzano still under A.M.G.
Italian Delegation to Council of Foreign Ministers,
headed by De Gasperi, arrives in London.
Council of Foreign Ministers discusses Italian
colonies; Russian proposal for trusteeship over
Tripolitania.
Council of Foreign Ministers' decisions regarding
Venezia Giulia--(i) line to be as nearly as possible
the ethnic one; (ii) Trieste to be internationalized.
Inaugural meeting of "Consulta." Sforza elected
President. Separatist risings in Sicily.
Sicilian Separatist leader Finocchiaro--Aprile
arrested in Messina.
Unification of purge measures throughout the
country.
Liberal criticisms of Government policy.
Draft decree on Constituent Assembly prepared.
Italy re-admitted to I.L.O.
Armistice terms published.
New epuration law passed.
Allied Supreme Command restores control of Italian
army to Government.
Liberals propose widening of Government.
Liberal Ministers resign from Government.
Parri resigns.
De Gasperi asked to form Government.

Muriel Grindrod, The New Italy
(London, 1947), pp. 104-109.
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